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T.NTRODUCTI Olf 
1 . Problem. 
Tho intention ot this study ia to investigate aomo or 
the implications and ramifications of tho ooncopt of biolo-
gical evolution in tb.o philosophy aolf·doacribed as "Evolu-
tionAry Naturnl19m", by Roy 1ood Sollars. 
Tho point or departuro taken will be2 in its first im-
portant biolo~ical applications, "evolution" denoted a pro-
c !'IS obnorvod in tho ecionce or biology; but o.ftor the con-
cept was ~ll•dovolopod in biology, both the ord and the 
concept wore taken over by other fields or study. Somotimea 
tho word was applied wrongly; and the concept was given ap-
p11oat1ons in other study-disci~lines which had no analogues 
in the abstract study or b1olo y. Insofar aa philosophy 
builds on knowled furnished by the sciences , the concept, 
whon accepted as a valid b1olo"1oal interpretation, doea 
affect any system of philosophy. The question of how the 
eoneopt affected tho philosophy of e particular man will be 
considered. 
It is noteworthy that evor since The Or1~in of SEocies 
was publiahod thoro has been a runn1ne conflict between 
biological thou ht nnd rel1 1ous thousht. Tho roconc1liat1on 
or those is a phil osophical problem. 
2 . Motbod of Dovoloomont . 
After def1nin~ biological evolution and recording a 
i 
general survey of Sollars ' philosophy, this otudy uill 
examine i n detail the philos ophy of Gellars t o aacertain 
the extent and nature of t he influence of i deas of biolo-
gical evolution on his philosophy . 
3 . Sources . 
This thes i s i s more concerned with tracing the ma jor 
effect o of evolution on ellar a ' system of philonophy t han 
\li t h onuner s ting a ll t he scattered non- oystemic instances 
of influence . Accordingly, much ~ore uoe hao been made of 
3ellars ' books than of hio a rticles. 1 
Evolutionary Naturalisc is used as t he chief source 
uhich shoHs t he i nfluence of evolutionary t hought in Sellars' 
2 philo~ophy . ~1nce Sellars s t ates th~t t he f 1rot h~lf of 
·.::volutionary ra.t uralism 1s a recast of Critical Realism - - -
and Evolutionary Naturalism does certa i nly deal at length 
wi th hi s ep1ste molory --- and since hio epistemolo shows 
little effect of evolutionary i dea& , ..,rit1cal Realism ~las 
not read or referred to in t he prepar a tion o f t h i s thesis . 
A preli minar ,v read 1.ng of Tho Philos ophy of Phys ica l Realism 
1n11cated a metaphysical position little different fro 1 t hat 
of F.volutiona.ry Nat uralism, \-l ith wuch more e mphasis on philo-
s ophy of ccience , particula rly physics , and mucl l ess emphasis 
on the m.e taphyaica of tho h i gher levels . Thus !'he Philosophy 
1 . ~uot~t1ons ln Stlernott e , ER, provide evide~ce for believing 
that e l l o.rab a.rt1cleo do not choH any r ad ic.llly d ifferent 
thought f rom his books, an~ th~t h1o oyot oc of t houcht haa 
not cl4'1nr;ed rr.uch, since t he publicat ion of Evolutiona:ry 
rfl.tur:t-11!:., . 
2 . E , 20 . 
i i 
of Phya i cal ~ea.lism \iaa ad judged repeti tlous and much leas 
va luable for the subject of this thesis and \laa not otudi cd 
exhaustively . The Principles a11 Problews of ?hilosop& ua.o 
not uoed bocauae , being an elementary or beginner ' s book , i t 
is too limited & oample of Sellars ' ph1loaophy, of neceos i ty 
diluted with ch historical material . The renaininz books, 
specula tions on the fut ure of r eligion and political organl-
zat-on, and a treatise of logi c , were deemed too far removed 
from diot1nctly philosophical problems \lhich might be influ-
enced by evolution to be of value in the present study . 
Of confirmatory value in appra1o1nc t le characterization 
of 3ellar..,' .Jhilosophy after t he ur1t1'1g of Chapters II and 
III , a nd V'lluable for providing a complete bibliography of 
bellara ' '1-Torko , \'Jas an unpublished doctoral d1asertat1on1 , 
loaned very graciouoly by the aut hor . This dissertat ion 
iii 
compared Sellars and Alexander; and part of it \'las later revised 
and published under the title, God and ~pace- r1~e . Diblio a -
ph1es of Sollars ' r.ublished \'IOrks , in varying degrees of 
comprchcns1 veness and convenience , \"lore also found in Conten-
por~ry ~orican h1looophy2 and the Library of Congress 
cata.lor- . 3 
Sears' book4 '1-ta.s exoectod, from the t1 tle , to be a 
1 . Stier~otte , ER . 
2 . Adam~ e ontaguc , OAP . 
3 . ':f . , belo\t , BIT) T '1-RAPHY , first item. 
4 . -:ears , CD. 
biography ot Dnr~1n; it turnod out to bo nn historical study 
of tlw offeoto ot Dnrwin ' s publications on the general 
culture . Unfortunately, it did not deal largely with philo-
sophy. &volut1on and the Founders ot Prae!!t1am1 deals with 
Darwin 's 1ntluonce, direct or indirect, on '::illiam .TaiDOs , 
Charles Saunders Pierce, o. • Holmes, John Fiske, Green, 
and another lawyor. Of this group, James 1s the only pro-
fesaional philosophor; and the author givos very little 
attontion to oitb r major or dota1l ed philosophical problems 
in his discussions or .Tames. Howevor, tho book 1D valuable 
in giving the flavor or the culture at tho turn of tho 
contury. 
Climate in the study- field or biological evolution 
ran s from tha random- mochanical explanation seemingly 
2 tavorod by Dunn & Dobzhansk7 in descr1b1 gonotics to the 
certainty or divina intervention urged by du Noll73 * Yot, ot 
many books studied ror information on biolo~ical questions , 
onl~ one4 aeemod to havo either a grasp or, or a concern for , 
philosophical problems and their relation to science. But 
that book 1a excellent. 
4. Previous \' ork. 
A thorough aoarch of the published 11sta or doctoral 
5 disnertatione or American universit1 a failed to bt'ing to 
1. ~ !enor, EFP . 
2 . Dunn w Dobzb.ans ky, tmS. 
~ . da ouy, HD . 
4. Otis, DDE. Vorr 1ntoreoting, but a little slow to read. 
5 . Trot1er and Hn~an, DDAU. 
iv 
ligbt any comparable ork publiahod or in procos3 nt the 
time . An exao1nation of tho card t1lo catalog or Maator•s 
theses of Booton Un1vors1ty also cave no evidence ot an~ 
similar reseax-oh. A "Sollars Jlemorial Issue" o-: th Journal 
or Pll1loso2hY and PhEtnomenolo3icnl Resoareh has a.pp ared 
since this s tudy as bogun1; and it contains an article rela-
tive to evolutionary thought in Sellars• ph11ooophy; but 
that article does not dup11cnte the present thosis, either 
in 1ntent or content . A book was round describin~ the etfoct 
2 
or evolutionary ideas on the rounders of pra t1am ; and 
Soars, al::so3 , 1nt6rproto so:uo ot the historical effects ot 
evol utionary ideas on philosophy 1n gonornl; but noithsr 
doals with Sollars ' work1 in particular •. 
1~· SOptomber, 1954. 
2 . Wiener, !::PP . 
3 . Sears, CD. 
v 
I. THE OIOLOGICA!. IDEA OF EVOLUTION 
Until very recently, three ideas dominated in what 
"evolution" meant to the biologist --- ideas typified by the 
names of Durwin, Lamarck, and DeVries . The theories ot these 
three bad both points or differonoe and points of community. 
Their significant disagree nt concerned tho method or 
evolution, not the question whether evolution h s occurred. 
Lamarck held to the • inheritance or acquired character "· 
Darwin was aware of Lamarck's work and conditionally accepted 
a form or his theory, "pangenesia", as a working hypothesis . 
Ho was convinc d that there are vnriations in the inheritance 
or individuals of tho same apocies; but that these are "natu-
ral variations" , far beyond any control by living things . 
Onco the vari ations did appear, however, Darwin as illing 
to concode the influence of living croaturos in determining 
which variants should survive to reproductive a go and acti· 
v1ty. 1 This phase or the theory he called "n tural selec-
tion" . Dar in ' s grasp or genetiea was tenuous , ho ver2 J 
and the "gene" theory had not been formulated in his time . 
The thoory or "genes" holds that each characteristic of a 
r. by the variant should "breed true", i . e . , pass on ita 
variation o? £6a inheritance noroally-oiPGcted or a m-
bor or that species , instead or passing on the "standard" 
heritage, Darwin apparently doos not d!aeuas . SUch a 
l ack of discussion might be considored a serious detect 
in Darwin ' s thinking; but Dar win, as a scientist, was 
merely attempting to describe what he observed rather 
than to explain it. 
2 . Dodson, TOE, 91 . 
1. 
creature (such as oy color, pattern of laavos, etc . ) is 
determined by a separate unit of the • rm cell, on an all- or-
noth1nG basis . This thoory, in connection with •ondol ' s 
obsorv tions , lod DeVries to tho idea or evolution by "muta-
t1on"1. DeVrios ' explanation repudiated minute , uantitative 
variations in favor of sudden, dr stic, qualitative changes 
in the genetic mako- up ot eomo mombor or the apoc1es in 
which eho.nge is observed . Once "mutational" changes occurred, 
they were held to breed true---sudden distinct changes that 
breed true being hold to be leas mysterious, in the light or 
the gene theory, than continual slight variations that bred 
true once they had occurred. 
Recent facts , investigations , nd the ories bid fair to 
ivo satisfactory explanations of tho origin and nature of 
evolution--~at loast in terms of the laws or physics---but 
biologists ore very much at a loss to decide amon~ tho three 
idoas outlined abovo at tho time when Se llars was f ormul ting 
2 his motnphysics . In fac t , ono commentator on the history of 
tho evol utionary idoa finds tho tbroo docndes f ollowin the 
turn of tho Century an "Ago or A , ost1cism" . 3 
Nevertheless , a~ostic thounh thoy mi~ht be in regard 
to the method of evolution, thoro was no s1Fnificant d1s -
aFreomont with the contention that biological evolution had 
1. Dr. H. E. Crow suggests, in conversation, the use of 
"s altation" , amon seneticists, as a more accurate term 
than "mutation'' • 
2 . Evolutionary Naturalism was published in 1922. 
3. StGb6!ns, quoted In Dodson, TOE, 91 . 
2 . 
occurred. Tho meaninc or such a contention is not, perhaps, 
sel!'- evident , here , however . Dodson e;u.>roases it: ubut 
always a particular fauna resembles that of another poriod 
near it in timo more closely than it doe s that or any othor 
period remote froQ it in t~o . "1 The fact of change in the 
naturos of species, during poriods of time of t ho magnitudes 
with hich geology deals , seems to be r nthor well estab-
lished; unloss ono wishes to deny any kinship whatever to any 
membors or such a seemingly- continuous sories of fossils , 
dug from such a seemingly- continuous corresponding series of 
goolo c earth levels, as , for example, the series that runs 
trom Eohippus to the modern horae . 
Darwin and DeVries would undoubtedly havo agreed with 
2 the majority of modern biolo ,ista that no pur posive pattern 
is to be found in biological evolution --- that its move-
monte aro random. It is significant, however, to point out 
3 that a careful minority bolioves that purposive pattern is 
to be found ; and t hat it io ovidoncod by th fairly straight-
f orward, if some nat prolonged, advance from ono- celled life 
to self- conscious and self- determining Uan, amon~ other 
evidences , 
If evolution is r andom and purpoceless, and therefore 
unpredictable, thon the formulation of "lawsn of evolution 
is an absurd undertaking . Under these conditions, th only 
1. TOK, 8~ . 
2 . Including Simpson, Dobzhanaky, and Dodson . 1 
3 . Represented, in this biblio r aphy, by DuNouy. 
3 . 
possible area of formulation is retrospective tracing of 
pnst oocurronces, trying by intensive search and a series 
or oduc,ated guesses to asai n a line of de scent. Biolo ists 
have been vory active ln attempting to mark out theoe con-
tinuities of generations --- active even to the hypostati-
zation of "missing links" . 
noodless of t he non-toleolo~1cal position that most of 
thom ould take, so biologists havo ~one blithely ahead t o 
the formulation of l aws of evolution. The Law of Rocap1tu-
lat1on (Biogenetic Law) or Ernot Tiaock 1 is perhaps t he out-
standing reproacntative of this group ; alt houp,h mention 
might be made of such othors as Von B er •s Principles, 
Allen's rule , rgmann ' s rule , Cope's Law, Dollo•s, and 
Gloger•s , tho gi p,as habitus , Goldschmidt•& "position effects", 
1 bipolar mirrorism, tho purity of gametes , and polyploidy, 
The Law of Recapitulation ia ore widely known than most 
of the other laws of evolution. This fact may account t or the 
reater number of misconstructions placed on and deduced t roc 
it. It is sufficient, for this discussion, to note that 
"onto eny retraces phylogeny . " has boon both usod to "prove" 
that certain spocies h d certain histories bocause t ho!r 
ombryos develop in eert 1n pattorns , and used to "explain" 
oooaaional obseuro otagos of embryonic dovolopmont in terms 
of a roconstruoted or eseed- At evolutionary history of the 
i . cr., Dodson, TOE, 56 , 63, 251, 249, 185, 186 , 261, 345, 
~-207, 379, 241, 350-360. 
4 . 
opecieo. It may w 11 be objected (1) that such a theory is 
not proot, and (2) that such a double use or the thoory as 
is outlined above is decidedly circular. 
Another point of agreement among oost biologists con-
cerns the slowness or tho chango or tho inheritano or a 
spocies . Even Lamarck, believing that the individual's own 
emphasis and development or certain parts or neoda or skills 
resulted in cban~ad hor1ta for that individual's offspring, 
was contont 1th tho idea that many generations and Millennia 
aro necessary to produce a new species. 
Summary. 
In sp1 te or the many other th1n3a "evolutionu has ::neant 
to various b1olo late, it has consistontly moo.nt one thing 
clearly, to all2 continuity or descent combined with odifi-
cat1on of inheritance. 
5 . 
II. A Sl::LLARS GLOSSARY 
Sellars doeo , as do man1 other writera, give his own 
special meanings to somo orda already in ide•spread use 
with other common connotations . Somo or those pr1vato 
definitions fol low. 
1 . Th1ng. 1 
"Thine" 1a a broad term including all that can be loca-
ted in scientific opaco and sciontiflc timo (tho space o.nd 
time moasurod by yardsticks and wntchoe} , and th3t which is 
immaterial but can be traced back to a matorial origin. An 
opistemologieal definition might be : that wluoh is outside 
tho consciousness, capable of being known. Doth existents 
and subsistonta are things . 
2 2 . Existent. 
Almost ao broad a.s 11 th1ng", nexiatont" does always refer 
to a particul ar object which oan be measurably located in 
time and apace and can be measured in other ways by the 
science of Physics . For example , tho relation or particles 
!n n atom can not be rooasurcd othor than spatially and tem• 
·porally by Physics , i . o ,, not 1n such terma as mass and 
-
color . This relationship, thon, is a "thing" , a subsistent, 
but not an exiotont . Oenorall~, Sellars prefaces "existont" 
1. of. , Sollars , EN, 144, 125, 152. Aloo, 371 124- 127, 132, !S'1. Throughout t ho following pagos, the author referred 
to will bo Se llars, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 . Ct. , EN, 31- 33, 38, 44, 49, 51, 5'7, 61, 153, 212 . 
lj . 
1th tho adjective "p~sical"J but all his usage see~s to 
presuppose the modifier . 
Existents arc known through the data they cause. 
-
1 3. Datum. 
Sollars rostrlets his use of "datum'' to the meaning of 
the o OtiWlon phrase, "sense-datum". For him, a datum in an 
event in consoiousnoss, given by the purely biolo~ical act1-
v1t1ea or sonse-organ, norvoa, and brain, ill n tho organ is 
stimulated from outsido by a real physical ovont. Sollars 
would go along with IIegel and so many othors o insist that 
tho conscious being is never atnlre or the datum, as nuoh; 
or at loast not until after the datum baa stimulated a per-
ception which includes the classification and interpretation 
ot itself. Sellars would insist that any data, given in a 
-
pattern , are necessary for even the simplost perception. 
But this limitation on concoious activity does not clter hie 
connotation. 
Data aro somo of the cont nts or consciousness. 
-
2 4 . Content. 
"Contont" is a shortenDd .form of the phr oo, "contents 
of consciouenossu, 1n Sollars' op1stemology. The contents 
of coneeiousnoss include tho sense-dnta, tho1r clnss1~1ca-
t1on, tbo1r interpretation as an oxtornal object, tho univer-
salo by wnich thay ere classified, ideas, enot1ons, 
1. cr., ~~. 25-2S, 28, 30, 37, 41, 50·51, 54, 70, 98 , 303. 
2 . C?:, EN, 25, 27, 33, 43, 61, 65, 70, 132, 208. 
-
7. 
judgments, and memor1os . 
Ep1atomolog1oally, Sollars luops everything into ono 
classa contonts of consciouanoss . Physical objects are 
alwnya known 1 tb a c rta1n cauaal element 1n tb proco sa 
("presento.tiv ly'•) , 1n addition to the elasa1f'y1ng~ rGlat1ng 
tunot1onu or eonsoiousneaa 1n tho proceas . Suba1 tenta are 
lmovm ttropresentativoly~ , without a direct physical timulus 
of a sense organ; i . e ., th y t.U"e lmom as cone "ts. nowever, 
-
Sellarot point is that, durin~ tho net or kno 1ng, and ao 
-
eontent9 or eon3e1ousnoas, subsistonts and cx1stento are 1n-
diot1n uishnblo . Only retrospection or introspection allows 
tho d1at1nct1on of the abstracted and remeaborod universal 
from the immediately-caused particular.1 On this basis, ho 
rojoets tho real1t7 of a "montal" realm, distinguishable 
from realms or subeiotents, existents, and/ or "psychic" 
ovonts . 2 It will be shonn, later, how SOllar finda all 
throo of th latter in 'tatter. 
1 . cr., EN, 57- 63. 
2 • .,,, GO. 
3 . Th1s sentence 1a 1n tho order a scientist (or Sellars) 
~ould ~• in oxpros 1ng it. Ho ver, sooo philosophers 
(per pa e 1 and Bo ) would point out t t , if only 
rotrospoet1on or 1ntro•poet1on can d1st1ngu1eh (or 
1dont1ty ) dnta and concepts, then porhapa it is beenuso 
v:o havo porcoptions that e can knoT1 w have contont.o. 
Chronolo~1cally a~d oet physic lly, Sellarn' state~nt 
1s probably correct; but it does 1nvolvo a spoculativG 
hypothos lo not quito consistent vritb hio prov1ously• 
eitod atatornonts . 
8 . 
5 . orcopt1on. 1 
Sellars uses thio 
cl 861 ylng and other 
ord to donoto o1ther tbo process of 
oe interpreting dntn 1n consciousness , 
-
or the finished result or the process, tho intorprotation of 
tho ~· He insists that both the givon data and conoeioua 
activity are 1ntcg~al ele nt3 or perception. 
s . or tho intorpretations in perception involve th 
oatogor!os. 
2 6 . category. 
T concept of categorl has a very specific oeaning tor 
sellars; except 8 concepts tho categoric~ havo no po r, no 
ontological status, a l though they can bG de:scrlbod. Eoeo.u e 
h n thousnt uniformly follo s eertn1n procoosoc in pereoiv-
1ng, tho mind can be cr.poctod to oporato in doto 
Tho categories . ro tbeso ways or thinking. For oxamplo, ex-
ternal objocts aro always perceived o.s bo1ng ro tod to t• 
porcipiont boing, and porhapa to other oxtornal objects , 
to orally and spati ally. Tho human mind uni~ormly usoa 
theso fratlaa of rctoronce in perceiving objects . Thoretore , 
~ ani ::SRO.C,o nre categories. Although categories are 
pri rily eplatomolo 1cal catogor1Gs, hie epistemological 
real15m makos thom metaphy 1c 1 cntegor1ee , also . 3 Ono or 
!. cr. , Ell, 23, 2s ,. 29, st.- 33, 3e, 70, 139, 112, 21a, 227. 
2 , ~. r.:.·, Ch. IV, nd 70, 79, 89, 74, 601 261, 299. 
3 . Wto this point, Sellara acknowledges no doubt about tho 
oxnct corroepondonco (soo p . lf; below) bot ~en poroep• 
tion end tho exiatont wb1ch caused it, no doubt about tho 
ab!l1ty of aind to know, oxnotly and fully, tho n ture 
9 . 
Sollars • m~st i~ortnnt catesor1os is that or thinebood. 
7 . Th1n(3hood. 1 
. mnover consciouenoee "recognizes" a complex o.:C eonso-
data---thai~ 1o1 clnss1fios thom--it al aye does eo -ith tho 
conviction tho.t tb.Gro is a "thing" outeido tho bodY' co.uelng 
the sensations. Or, 1t c oul d be said t t senno -datn aro 
al,ays intorprotod ithin the idoa of an extarn l object . 
Sollnra has·-11\m that other naturalist Santa-;rana- --an 
2 
"anioal r a1tb thnt tho hucan habit or construetine objoots 
(~) is suffioiont arranty that objects exist externally 
and that t hnbit , \ hich .!! t cat gocy or th1nghoo4, 1a 
sound. 
Sollars' epistomologico.1 broak with naivo r aliem ia at 
this point about construction ot the object by t kno r~ 
rathor than its immodicte 1ntu1t1on by him. 
8. Intuit . 
'i'bB vorb doos not carry, for Sellars , any or tho moaning 
of physical thincs . Ho1 vor, &oo tho footnote at hl 
ond or 8, bolo • 
1. r.t ., .... T, SO, 132,. 152. 
2 . This doos, in effec t , make t he existence , tho eharaetor1-
zation, and tho h~otledco of terial thine much mor a 
function oZ t ho individual conscious va than SOllars 
ould l1ko to ndmit . .aoro soems to bo no logically 
valid reason for not auggestin~ that tlw knowor completely 
detor:tin~s tho c ontont of knowledge, no • ~ellaro' onl,. 
eftoctivo ropl7 ~uld bo that data aro givon catsally from 
out~ ide; and his c rtainty of tho ei vun•ne s of do. ta is 
not ll supported, booaus h u doos not develop ~con­
copt or will to tho extent Bo•mo and Br1ghtcnn do. 
3 .• EN, 25,-
4. cr. , EN, 27, so, sos. 
-
10. 
Ot "grasp" • "understand", Ol" "acquire int:Jight'' that it has 
1n Much usage . "Intuition" !a referred, as is a l l knowledge, 
to exto1~al objects, and is used to mean simply "to know 
directly", without modiation. As Sellar11 see the "naive 
ro l ist' " poe!t1on, such a process ot intuition raises 
host ot questions: ho could a largo object like a mountain 
coma into tho body of a poraon; r:hcthor the mind ce.n lenve 
tho body to co~ in direct contact th nn object; etc. How-
ever, thoso probloms need not bo cons1dorod;. beoauao Sellars 
is convinced that oonscioucnoao is nevor in diroct contact 
lth tho object o~ eonociouonoas . =von data como to con-
-
sciouoness through tho di a or aonse- organ, 
and brain. Thore is no 1ntu1tion. 1 
2 9 . T.nowledgo . 
rve fibor, 
Since there is no intuition, all knowlodce must be 
1. Se11ars would tako tho Lockian 'osition that contont or 
coneci ousn Gs come onll from data . li~. , ii' one h a 
mory, it is becauso , previously ·um was rocoived 
and porcelved by tho bra in, and tho Grain was loft with 
a pbyo1cal change v:b.1eh no · cnn stimulate 1n co~soioue­
noos a content oim1lar to the one arous d b~ tho original 
datum. Sol!ars would ¢1V no accoptanco, tevor, to a 
suggect1on or solf-exc ited or selt-oro t ed contents ot 
consciousness; s o that ovon contents are not intuited 
laws of blolo y, chooistry, a~d physics . cr. , E , 20. 
liowovor, an tcriti~nl roal1st• , rather tfian a •naivo 
1~&11~t• , Sollar doos not find tho tabula complotely 
r so., no Loclro dooo. Tho brain, in . d!a£1ng t con-
€on£s o£ consciousness ~ubjecta thom to cortain 1· 1ta-
tione~ tho eatogori os among othors . t th1s point, 1t 
is vocy difficult to oeo ho Sell:1rs can admit thDse 
limitations , admit the possibility of error, and then 
insist that our e~por1ont1al knowlodaP ia certain onougb 
to cide quoetiona of matnphysice . 
2 . cr., , 29, 33, sa, 40, , 140, 294, 302 . 
-
ll. 
mad1ated. 1 Sellars agroos that all knovledgo of external 
objects !! mediated by their c~acity to stimulate the sense. 
organa, by tho sense- organs tbomselvoa , and by the conscious-
ness hioh interprets sensations . Sellars restricts knowledsg 
by writing, many titles , that all knowled6! is knowledge of 
2 physical objects J if be wero to admit any such abstract dream 
as a non-oxiotont objoct, he would deny the pose1b111ty of 
knowioo anything about it . Uowover, porcoption is not all ot 
knowlodge; it is nothing r.1oro than tmowing that some object 
is outside oonsciousnoos stimulating tho sonso- orgnne in a 
pnttorn recognizably tho sam as so1n0 previous p ttorn or 
stimulation. Vlbet the nature is , of such an object as could 
stimulate in this y , must bo hypothesized by tho conscious 
3 
mind from tho 11oues" givon to perception. This speculation 
is not yet knowledge , ho ovorJ at the very most 1 t ould bo 
partial lmowledge . To expand knowledge , or to test this 
hypothosis , the conscious being can do sevoral things; ho can 
compare rurthor perceptions or the same object with his first 
impression; ho can deduce trom tho h,-pothet1cal naturo further 
character1st1cs or aya of reacting, which ho can toet for 
(prediction or expor!onces 1a thus the test ot truth)J and 
:r. tit. a!, 56 • 
2 . EN, 35:t'. Note that ho allows kno ledge of other minds (EN. :56 , 394), but only on tho bo.ses that (1) mind is a 
physical category, (2) tho s,mbols or ouos leading to 
lmowledgo are physical, and (3 ) the mind or tho knower 
is basically physienl and thoreforo can sympathetically 
roproduco tho states or another basically- physical mind. 
3. "Knowledge is a group of propositions referred to a physi-
cal object. n (EN, 41) lli• E , 54. See p . 9 , fn . 3. 
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ho can compare this hypothesis with othor hypothoaoa 1n 
momory to ascertain that it 1s not contradictory or con-
trary to them and is coherent with them. 1 As hypothBsee 
are correct or are correctod, lmowledgo 1ncroaoea, both in 
2 quantity and unterconnoctednoea. Por Se llars, then, all 
knowledge is partial, mediated, and inferential. 3 
4 10. Object . 
Sollars always uses "object" to mean object of atten-
tion or eerceet1on. no never moans the physical exiatont; 
because , claiming all kno led o is inferential and partial, 
be denioa that .o can kno tho ox1stont ns it ronlly 1s.5 
Hol vor, since full knowledge of the ox1atent is non-oxistent, 
Sellars doos not discuss existents turthor but limits himsol.t" 
to using tho Tlord "objoot" to mean ' t he e:'!ietont ao tar as, 
and in the y that, 1t 1s known to tho individual•. He says, 
at one potnt6 , that the knower makes or constructs the object. 
!. h~t 40. 
2 . This bears a atrango ' and striking rosomblaneo to an omoiri-
cal coherence criterion ot truth1 If followed consistent-
!y, £h!a £rend could oaeily destroy the realistic el mont 
or Sollars• "critical realism" and, with 1£, fils material-
ism. cause, aside tro~ a stubborn pro-co~it nt to 
materialism, hie only ph1losopb1cal justification or it 1s 
~ivon by the realise or his epistemology. I . o ., only the 
material world bas given predictable uniformities and 
publicly vor1f1nble oxperioncesJ ergj only oatter is real. 
3 . El, 199. On this basis, sellars• op s temolo~ could just 
as oneily oupport a plural or an idoal metaphysics as the 
material monism he clings to, and \?bich h claims is dic-
tated by hie epistocology. 
4. cr., E , 23, 27, 31, 33, 45 , 49, 74, 169. 
5. C?;, p. ll, rn. 1, above . Sec , in noxt chnptor, section 
on Epistemology tor discussion of this inconsistency. 
G. Er' I 2:S. 
1? 
11. Corrospond.1 
Lost tho objoot appoar quit arbitrary, Soll.D.ra ha tens 
to insist that thoro io a corroopondonco betwoon tho object 
as conceived and the existent as it 1a, por so. T oxaet 
naturo or tbia relationship 1e unclear. 
s 12. Physical. 
2 
All reality is pbzsieal, ror Sellars. Early thinkers 
p laeed .too much restriction on the Rhysicnl world by limit-
ing it to the motion of matter . Sellars calls his mota-
phyaics a phzsical tponiamJ but ho expands ttphys1cal" to 
cover everything to which a connection with an existent can 
bo trneod.4 Concepts , for example, have reality by being 
products of tho mind mich depends on the brain, h1ch io 
physical . (To Sollars dopondonce is the criterion of emor-
genco , and 1c the denial or ultimacy in reality. ) Tho only 
non~physienl entity Sellars could imagine ould bo a dis-
embodied sp1ritJ and the reality or such ghosts as God is 
emphatically denied. 
13. La • 5 
Undor tho necessity of giving o. definition, Sollnra 
holds that a natural law is the human observation and rormu-
-
lation that eortn1n ovents follow a certain soquonce. HUmans 
1. ct. , .uil, 31, 72, 197 .. 
2 . TOO' noxt chapter ill find , moroovor, that tho bollet 1s 
unsupported. See , below, pp .2l-27. 
s. Cf . , EN, 156, 162, 197, 200, 244, 293, 299. 
4 . ' 313. 
s . cr. , h~. 14, 130, 142, 160, 169, 247, 249, 2ao. 
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often mnko those rornulat!ons after obaerv1ng the uniform 
ropotit1on or a oequonee; but tho law does not exist outa1do 
tho m1nd. 1 And, . nlthough ovent~ have regularly aos~d this 
sequence 1n the past, there ia no noee~sary roaaon t~t tho,. 
111 do eo again in the future. 
Yot~ unexpoetodly, Sellars ould bo one or th f irst to 
osche aollpsiem, to insist that thoro are uniformities in 
tho sequonces or nature , that tho uni:torm1t1 s cnn be known, 
and that they are tho moot useful knowledgo we bo.vo . 2 
3 14. CozttX)ct1on. 
Sellars usos , in neonnection", a very vague term Which 
covorn any type of rolation Wh teve~ . 
4 15. Continuity. 
Whore other wr1toro use ''ub1ty" to aic;nity a rolat1on 
ot two objocts, Sollars uses "oont1nu1ty11 • Tho particular 
relation is not opocified. Thus two objects otand1ng 1n a 
spatial rolntion have a "spatial cont1nultyn. And if ono 
object ic, in any way, a "doaoendant" or another, their ro-
lntionah1p is a to~oral or "genetic continuity", sinee t1me 
-
is ehnnr;o . In hie w1t1ng o.r objoeto, "eontinu!.tyu eeoms to 
1. Ho seems moat 1n:.1stent tho.t mentality sho.ll hnve no 
metaphye1cal power in the unlveroe. 
2 . Uio empiricism demands the vio1'1Po1nt of th1a lattor para-
cuoaph. His materialism demands the form r . Tho l ..... ek of 
harmony botween these two aspeets or his thought is dis-
cussed in a lo.t r chapter. 
3 . Cf., Li~, Ch. X, and 198, 200- 202, 256 . 
4 . Gr., EH, 9Gt, 150, 153, 159, 195, 200, 208, 213, 284, 297 . 
-
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be synonymous with "connection" . 
l 16 . Struc ture . 
Any form, or org n1zation, or pattern. or outline is 
structure . fl hat was formerl y called tho extension of a 
body, would be a part or its structure. Tho connection or 
nourons in n animal body to form a norvous system is tho 
structure of tho system. If two objects aro fJ) rco1ved in 
spatial relation to each othor, tho objects and their rela-
tion form tho structuro or consciousness at that moment . 
Probably , Sellars moans the "structure" or an object to be 
synonyttous w1 tb 1 to "nature n . 
2 17. Function. 
Although Sollars does not specifically define the word, 
ho would probably bo satisfied with a definition or "function" 
as "processes caused by thG nature or". Thus function is 
very intimately tied to structure . 
3 18. Or ganism. 
"Organiamtt always re!'ora to a living organism. Sellars 
generally uoes tho word in place or "human" or "mind", to in-
dicate that a man is a unified orcaturo with no complete dis-
junotionc bet ~on parts or levels . Tho •division of labor ' 
among tho various organD and levels , and the eo- operation 
r. cr., ~N, s7, 10. 
2 . Cf:, Ej, 188, 331, 354 . 
3 . C?:, EN, 37 . 164, 105, 294, 290, 302, 334 , 336. 
-
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among them, nro an important part of his moaning or 
"organis "• 
1 19. System. 
Sollnra is not n highly sys tomntic philosopher 1n the 
traditional seneo or the term; and he does not use ttsystom" 
in tho traditional way. An existent in its enviro nt or 
othor existents is, for hi • a szste~, bocause the firo t 
oxistent inter eta ith tho ot ra . It might be a 1d that 
a oystem had structure . A h~~ n individual interacts with 
hin environment and accordingly they, nlso, f orm a s:stem. 
The factor or organization co only connoted by ~system" is 
lacking in sollaro ' use . 
20. 2 rgonco . 
Emerggneo is both dotorm1nod and unpredictable. \fJhen 
neutrons, electrons , and protons eomb1no to form an atom, 
the pattern and ~uantities in which they eombin •determine• 
tho phyoical and chemical properties or tho elementJ yet it 
is impossible to •predict •, from lmowledgo or sub- atomic 
particles alone , what the properties or the participating 
element will be . Similarly, Tbo n tho two gases , oxygen and 
hydrogen, combine to form water, the wator oxhib1to tno ' 
phyoical and chemical properties not predictable trom any 
knowledge or tbe propert1ee of the gaoes. such examplos, in 
i . ct. , En, 156, 1os, 1aa, 191, Zl4 . 
2 . cf., EN, 13 t l GOf, 250, 273, 284, 297, 329, 332. 
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which struoturo dotorminos function, aro in evidonce plen-
tifully; and •new' properties emerco when now structures 
determ1rl6 •no•' !"unctiona. For Sellars, this accou."lts tor 
all novolt7 and tor tho e rgonco o! highor level from 
lower lovols; ~~ conseiousn as h a emerged from tho b1e-
ehemioal lovel of living organisms . Probably other thinkors1 
have usod " rgonco" 1th much or a connotation ot random 
occurreneo, or chance, or response to a favorable situation; 
but Ze llars does not . 
2 21. T1no . 
Thoro nro several 1doao or ti ---math maticnl, eo~mon, 
-
seientlfie---but roal ~ is change. Since all ronl thin3s 
a aco . T1mo fades w y into space. 
-
3 22. Explanation. 
Huce b.as bo n takon so a riouoly---cause has boon ao 
weake d---that explanation tor Sollars consists or nothing 
more than a description of antecedent conditions and a reci-
tation ot tho relevant laws. In fact, it is difficult to 
-
distinguish t e timoa n sellara bo1ieves ho is giving an 
explanation tram tho instances in hich he appoars to bo 
contont to morolr describe . o does not give explanations 
1. or example, soo HYn man, OLE# Dorgaon, CE, and Lloyd 
"org n , EE. Evon Simpson, l!.O , although ho does not 
cspo~~e tho iuea, uses t ·o~d this way. 
2. cr . , EK, lOG, 110, 112, 117, 154, 159. 
3 . cr., m, 14, 190- 191, 239. 
-
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in torm!l or purpooe , in any event. 
1 23. History. 
If t i i s cha 
-
, tb n h1storz 1a the sum or ohangeo. 
Ho.ever, t i mo doe not 
-
nny condition or det rmi 
rch uniformly by; any on change 
the c·anges that c nor 111 take 
p lac lntor. In this ay his tory ace 
2 
24. . Cumul ation. 
lates. 
An historical accumulation of properties , structures, 
and functions ia not a mora ocloc ticism, ho over. A cumula-
t1vo bein is ono in which tho hi hor parts and levels depond 
-
on, having emor god from, tho l ower parts and l~vole . CWir..ll a -
tion acts to put the levo le in a hi or rebical ordor of higher 
-
and l o or. Tho l o r lev ls and 1ntogr tiona aro nocesso.ry 
conditions to tho ocorsoneo of th n xt-hieh r levels nd 
intogr tiona . A pr xamplo of a cUJ:1Ulative .... h1etorr ia 
the dooeription of tho growth of a human infnnt . The physi-
cal and chemical lov ls must bo or g nizod into living m tter , 
and the livi ng matter must be specialized into respiratory, 
norvoua , circulatory, digestive , and othor systems beforo 
birth. Tho norvou system must then gro further fore 
loco ot1on and speech aro possible . And so on. Thus, the 
hi ghest levels function on tho basis of provioua growth, 
~~ c~~lativo Uiotorz. 
1. cr., EH, 1s4, 16a, zo1, 240. 
2 e ~~ I # 33le 
-
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III. A BRII:.~ SURV.t:.Y 0? SELLARS' PHILOSOPIIY 
This chaptor will traeo two ajor tcndoncioa in Sellars ' 
p!dlo~ophy . Ono 1s to nrd a physical roalis in metaphysics; 
tho other is toward an om~1r1c1sm in epistemology . Those 
tondencioe have an effect on Sellars • epistemology1, hie so-
lution or t~o mind- body problem, his unir ieation o~ t 0 
sciencoo, hie ocphnsis on evolution, and his rejection of 1od. 
1 . Episte ology. 
Soll ars doclaros that his opiste~logy is completely 
2 
empirical ; and, accordinglj, he will uso it to f lnd out 
3 hat is roal-··to dotorcino his aotaphysics . Ro g17es as 
his mot1vo tha charco th t 1doa11sm and othor metaphysical 
positions havo boo:l in orror and ilty of lld spoeul tion, 
and ~avo boen unnblo to account for orror, because they did 
4 
not follow this episte ological process . A co plote empiri-
cism should lead to vory intorostin" and truittul results . 
1. ff tl£fi8 physical ream" should dotermino Sollars' epiote-
mol o y, then lt ust b& noted that: to first doeide what 
is real, tbon to underta the episte ological cuost, and 
then to equato the lmo ablo 1th the real io (with the 
addition of the hidden assumption of ep1stooology that the 
unroal cannot bo truly known) dee idodly circular reasoning. 
2 . By "empir1c1sc" , Sollars me ns : w1111n neao to accept as 
roal1ty anything for hicb experioneo prov1doa roliablo , 
lo 1enl oupport . While tho •naivo ro liat • is supposed to 
accept all expor1onco at faco valuo, Sollars ' critical 
roal1sm insists on a logically coh&ront doscr1pt1on of 
the entity rospons1blo tor exporienco . 
3 . ,N, 20 . 
4. , 15 , ~o. 70n, 193- 197, 337. 
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Unfortunately, those roaults IlUut be !'orogone: Sellars 
is not co=plotoly empirical, boc~u~o h1s op15tomological 
investigation~ arc prajudicod by the bcl!of that phy~ical 
1 
existents out~ido t~ organism cnuso ~cnso-duta and. being 
roal, ust be 10.10 m . This physical r nl:t m has a great in-
fluonco ~n dotor~n!ng his Critical Rooliot opistecolo~. 
In kno :tlng physicul ex·ot~nts , Sollars holds that thoro 
is no question about thoir causal efficacy in :~yrossing 
2 their stimuli on tlw sonso- org ns. Sonse - datn are 1von to 
thG oonsc- organs; nlthou h in cases of unconsciousness, sloop , 
or oxtremo emotion thoy y not arrive 1 to consciousness. 
Ho ·over, ~von after tho ~ivon sonso - dnta and tho pnttorns in 
.h1ch tho~ aro given ~oroo lnto conscioWJnoss , thoy must be 
intorprotod b~ tho or anism boforo thero in a porcoption . 
Part of tlrls interpretation i~ a clasa1ficntion i n terms of 
romemborod previouA experiences . 3 Th:iD ia r.ot yet kno led 
of ro lity. To gain kno lod , the co nciousnoas must sk 
itnell' norr.o such queotion a ... , "i.hnt kind of n roe ity could 
4 
cj vo ~ this porcoption? ", and SEeculato n satisfactory 
! . ]!; : , 3(j , 3'7, 44 . 
2 . EN, 281 '37 . 
3 . In terms of romocborcd prov:ouz perceptions? If so a 
question ould nriso in ra rd to tho first porcoption. 
Sollurs oul d s y that tho b ... lit;y to perceive is an 
o rgont tunct on of noural orcnn1zat1on. but tho just1-
fic tion is 1n r:uestlcn. Soo L"! , 23, 26 , 38. 
4 . Sollnro ould object to tho .ordt but it is truo to the 
opirit or · nt c 'Wl'1toa. If ouch a conctruction, or 
thought about ronllty , is nacossary to kno lod o ; thon 
p rhnpn Sollars ' ep1ntomolo does detorn1no hi!' li'lBta .. 
physics, as he claims . ut it is also possiblo that he 
21. 
nnsr.cr . Thio lllo or ic continu~lly chocked to keep it ~chor-
c~t 1ith ncr. porcoptlcn~ . y continually · ypothcsizing and 
checldng the hypotho:J:a-- - t. o Sciclltlfic l- tho..: , inc~dont-
ally---a true kno;lcdgo cf tlc oxistont i vontu~lly gcinod . 
fr~t ho~ can ~he 1nd1viuu 1 bo certnin t t h1L ccn truct , his 
hypotl.osi!J , is n ruo pict ~·o of the ph slcal Ex1stont? 
Sollars se ms to lw.vc t .o no r·s to this undor the heading 
of correspondence thoorl· Th mora important phas of h is 
c orrosponcience thooi'y ln n de cription of n sort of "animal 
1 !'o.ithn thnt tho physical o1•ld ls s e v1eualizo lt . 
ThOl"G in a secondcry theory or cor rospondence \7hich 
Sellers mentions but does not develop in n1 detail . It 
hi!'lgos on his insistence that attorn, or structure ., or or-
t") 
~o.n_z tion, is functione.lly offoctive . ~ IJ.he theory focuse s 
on tll offect:l.vonoso of noul"lll st .. -•uctUI•c in brlnr:ing bout 
5 
cnnsciousness. Beyond th s it bocomon uncloar hothor ho 
ia cay1ne (1 ) that , •cnueo pnttorn is the o foct1"7a agent 
in coneciousnoas, and thoro is pattern to sonse-d tu ~hen 
rocoived, thnt tho pattern of tho oxtornal object in given 
4 d1roctlz to tto pnttorn- baeod consciousness ; or (2 ) that , 
being a function of pattern., con:J(:iouanoss hr..s n apocinl 
is r ly una\'v&ro of "O vine b th is epistemol ogy nnd 
his otaphyf'ica :limultn oously. 
1 . Ela~ ~~·•on o t o ph~ca of hie theory bo~lns belc ·, on 
'P r, ~3. AO 
2 . r:~", r-,.,.. 1 r'83 .. 204 , 3~:-" . ~00 di"'CUSSion bclo· .. , p g!' T • 
3 . E , 28~, 298, 513, 316 , 3~4 . 
4 . ~bio intorpretntion r.ould ke e11aro an opinte lc moniat , 
to hich he l7oul d seriouslr objoc t . 
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ability to think in terms of pattern---sympathetically, as 
it v:oro . Struct"~.:"c * he Dif'"'~ .t utly, iz nn i:1horont category. 
At any rnto , this concopt or corrcspondenco lo of minor 
top ortanco • 
!t is ro.thor ourpri::Jin...,. thnt , n~ \.ol tHl ~ellnrs know 
the thour-ht or tho p:ra .at1sto, ho did no~ give a prngnatic 
jl.lS tif lcation of !l he lief in corre~pondoncc . T o "Over, he 
does crlticizo the pra 
object or knowladr;n '1 • 
t:tr-t.a as not doi:l'"' justice to "tho 
Sellern 1 primary definition of ~o~rosnondencc tboorz 
undcrgooo , 1tsol~, n considorablo ovol~tio~; 30 that a clear 
and c~ncisc cho.roctorizntl on of it is hard to obtn1n. A 
sorios oi' ouotr1tionc best so:rven to dolinonto th() nnturo and 
basls o~ tho ~rosnondencC!_ o£ 'mowl odso to boiuc . 01• , as 
th.e ~.:!.n.al problc of ph11os'-~P~7 is to con.110ct tho 
ract and content of knowlodge with lts conditions . 
Kno.; :ne in a nc:.. nn must: b-.~ c£nnoc tod up with tho 
world ~h1ch tho sciences study. 
He dooms that connGctinf? knowintJ and tho wor ld vill be an 
easy process , bocauso 11 knor~ing is surely a natural operation 
rosting upon ovolvod abllities . n2 ;-.,e l'lnds c onfirmation of 
his theory or tho gro'fling ability to know: 
Xt,ha.t I have callod motor ada_pt~ tion ••• if: pr sent 
wherever ~e have to find out by trinl tho motor 
! . ~r, 2:- F or Zcl ars, the content of kno1:1lo~o is "ocioncon , 
and the condit:ions of kno ing tho physical world are "being 
:1bysi.cal11 and evolvin a hysical consciouaneGa . 
2 . EN, 21. 
activ1.tr requisite for getting certain sense-presen-
tations in a certain order. " ••• This division 
into the solf and tba not- solf is natural and inovi-
tablo . The wholo procoss is one of growth in .hich 
trial and error play an important part . • • • It is 
probable also that dos!res and instincts play thoir 
part in fho gro tb of tho sense of oomothing indo-
pondont . 
Such knowledge is poss1blo becauso "physica~ bein is dot r-
minato, and knowledge patterns aftor it in accordance with 
ito own mcdium.112 Certnin kno ledge \70uld so om to be fnirly 
ailtoma tic . 
But he r,oos on to insist: 
1ng ••• cannot be e1von to awarenoss . • • • Yot, 
unless e ivonness is cloarly the only kind of 
knowlodgc 1 ••• it does not provo that .'O can lmow 
only phenomon • ••• e humans do possess 1nfgr-
mat1on about the physical existents ~ affirm. 
Porhapo ''knowledge'' must be ro- detined ith- less or certain-
ty about it. At any rato, if complete knowlodgo is not pos-
sible , yet 
tbe very poos1b111ty or true knowledge implies some 
sort or correspondence bet een tho subjective datum, 
used in knowledgo , and the objoct. ••• our expor-
1once indicates an aetuel, causally-based corrola4 
t1on bet oen the physical existent and tho datum. 
But nat is tho exact nature or this correspondence? 
••• Tho datum is a corral ted rosponso to the 
stimulus . And !t io thia difforontial correlation 
th t rnnkDn the .rosont content v lid torial for 
lmo lodge or tho physic 1 \10rld. Kno .led must be 
1. !27-128. This oxcerpt includes a quotation from Stout, 
(h~ound ork of Pa, chology, 93 .. 
2 . El, 40. lhis Is a vory interesting theory; but Sellars 
adducos no eonvinci evidence to justify his stating it 
as a fact . 
3 . z r, 33- 54 
4 . E , :30 . 
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quarried out of it by patient co.nparison and ingen-
ious experimantal control~ But is not this precise-
ly what science effects? ••• Botwoen existent ••• 
and tho organism thoro is ••• n causal rol~tion but in 
the direction from existent to organism.~ --
Then knowledge is not automatic but must be gained· through 
toil . ~1hen Sellars says, 1n tho nrocoding oxcorpt, uThe . 
dntum is a correlated rospons~ to tho stimulus. "; we may 
justly dofin<:J, his "eor:rospondence" as a rele.t1onsilip . Tho 
particular na tu.ro o.f tho ro ln tionship---.an t animal fa 1 th ' .. --, 
will bo devolopod below. Still, slthough knowledse is not 
automatic; as long as tho mind is willing to work, a satis-
factory degroe of certainty can be attained becauoe 
the bohnvior or t~ings tlurows li&~t upon their con-
str..nt nature . Tho color of an object is becoming 
a eluo to its internal structure, physical and 
chom1cal. 2stl'ucture and function are intimately connected. 
Tl~ process, itsolf, of knowing seemn to bo not wholly con-
scious . 
Tho need or the organism is to achieve a presenta-
tional pattern corresponding to the physical onv1ron-
ment to ~hlch 1t must sd&pt itself. ! do not think 
that it is far- fetched to suggost that conaeioufiness 
it' n..'1 1nstrumont of tr..at ada.ptiveness or Zwecla:n~s­
sl£koit Which characterizes all orgnn1e li~o . ' ••• 
~r~ 'rncts indicate thnt tho orgnn1sm solactivoly 
receives stimuli in their roal order s.nd transmutes 
tnon into sense-data or n correspondinz order . 3 
And thG certainty bo~lna to fode . 
The critlco.l roalis'; ., •• realizes that ha hns specific 
kno~lcdgo of chango in tcrma of position, order~ 
structuro, bo nv:or and novelty of proport1es , but 
that tho inner lifo , o.s it ore 1 of those adjust-
anti and creative fusions in a measttro escapo [sic] 
him. 
In no caso ia thoro assumod to bo a resemblance 
bot, on a sonao-datum and it:J external cc.uso . "'" ,hat 
docs ho~d is an ordered eorrolat1on so thAt to evor.y 
dif.feronoe in the one thore is a difference in the 
othor wm1fold. It is because or this ordered cor-
relation that we are able to infor the aizo, atrue-
turo, behavior, posl~ion and intornnl constitution 
or physical objects. 
At least , if physical existents cannot be known, thoir nature 
can be conjured up y inference . 
The spatial and temporal order of things in all their 
variety is reproducible through tho correspondent 
correlation of data nd the nature of things . ~'no 
pattern or nature can be orkod out thro~ an infer-
ential study of the patto~ of apponrance. 
Kno lodgo ••• proauppoaos thio 1ntorprotativo a are-
nosD of tho data or observation ns n foundation; and 
yet goes boyond it in tho r fct'Onco of: propositions, 
built t~nfn tho so data, to aft'irmod physical axis-
tents , ~ as knowlodge about them. Tho propositions 
Qro ith:n con:Jciousne:Js , the reforonco is an act in 
consc1ousnoss; but tba existent, hich is tgo object 
of :1uch kno ledge , 1s not in conaciousn os . 
\"hat ov1donco juotif!os a belief' in correspondence? 
It io by an irres1ot1ble pressure of the material ot 
knowledge that l'JG think of it ns extended . • •• 
Space claims, then, to bo n eogn1t1vely objective 
category, to rnodio.te knowled e about reality. Judg-
ments of poait1on, rolativo size , contour, distance 
! . E , '161. Kant ould a eo, entirely, that ttthe inner 
life ••• escapes" :the kno or. Re would speak of "Phonomena" 
and a "din~-an-sich" . 
2 . El, 188. se1fars• use of such a vague multiplicity of 
positions in regard to "corr spondoncen ie somot1mcs dif-
ficult and frustrating to follo • 
3 . E , 1G3. Soe, also , En, 37, 72- 73 . 
4 . v. • Physical oxistenco is here redueod to the st tuo of 
a-DGlief about what io oxpor1onced . 
5. EN, 34 . 
and direction 1o, therefore, refGrable to the 
physical world . 
Sollo.rs • logical nr :nont bee omen shaky at this point . Fail-
ing to find conclusive ovidonco , ho urgos bel:f.of in corres-
oondcnco bocc.u.se "reflective experience finds no reason to 
~ joct this renl1:Jtic structu.ro"2 • In 'mother ple.co3, he 
appeals to tho popular bol1of in cnusal echnnism to ~upport 
a contention that belief in correspondence 1a roasonablo and 
obould thorofore be considered truo . lfever, in tho history 
of logic , has a valid process boon ndm1ttod to attest tho 
truth of premiaes . On tho same page, be implicitly assumes 
that nature is reasonable. Th t most people ould agree with 
him (if he moans knowable) is no absolution from a respon-
sibility to support and/ or justify tho contention. But the 
justification is iNnored. 
Sollars finally ndm1ts that tho correspondo ce of ' know-
ledge t and being !.s no rnoro t h n a "conviction" or an evolved 
acru:Jn tion. 
" • • 2 . 
3. 
Forco and mnttor in their untochnical s enso have no 
c~lanatory relovnnco in science, but they indlcato 
t1e realist's conviction that being is othor than 
tho contents o!' lmo .• lod~o, that phys i co.l t h ings aro 
substantial nnd bnve a aetoro1nate nat ure which must 
oxproos it::;olt in .hat occw•s. ck of t se terms 
the sense of objective determination lios. Our scnso-
dnta nnd our concepts have t lO c;:,vlou.s p.1yoical effi-
cacy, but m are convinced that procosaoA out there 
nro rooted in ao:notbins ~assivo n.nd off 1c1ent . Of 
, 99 
129. 
249. 
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thin dynamic agenc1 we cen11 as Uuao pcintod out, 
cn1n no intuition. 
Tho attitude , or set, or tho organism in perception 
floods consc1ouanoas with n sonse of the prasenco of 
somathin~ co~raal to r.btch tho self is attending. 
The motor i~ulce.s to rench out to, or to floo from, 
thle something carry out this £oolin3 ~nd develop 
it. • . • ~dditional eanin~s • •• add tbeCBolves to • •• 
constitute the bello~ in a co-1~al object~ ••• This 
nffi~tion •• • 1o ~lite clearly oxprossivo of the 
naturo and sitt!.ntion of tbe orgc.nlsm. Tho t:tt>uctura 
of c~nociousnocs re~lcct~ tho situation of tho orgnn-
if::."" • 
All this should surely eortify the conto-ntion that 
Sellars' opistomology ~ivoa , not certQinty, but only Q bo~ , 
liat that knowlodgo applies to a physical world .. 'fh{? dif-
ference betweon Sellars ' "cor1·oapondonce" and Santayana's 
"animal faith" seoms to d1.sappoar . 
Sellars t epictonology of bclio.f in phy~1c::.l existence 
can be accounted for in terms of {l) ~is insistence on 
physical realism. and (2) past idealistic thou~~t on epis-
tamo1.ogy which has 'm.Bdo tho position of diroct intuition of 
phjsical roality untenable . 
After physical ex1stents---nh1ch nro known through tho 
objcc~1ve ref'~nce, or the 1animal :raith", or tho "object 
of poreoption" eonstructod by the perceivor---thero ia kno\": ... 
lodeo not open to mensuro~nt by the tools of physical 
science . Sollc.rs' o~tpi:ricism. forces him to adirlt that tho 
3 c1oncaa o.r pnyeh.ology, logic, r.'lnthematics, o.nd othico are 
fields o£ true ttnowledgo and aro beyond the reach or physics. 
2[ 
Thoao non-material (in tb.o common use of tho tarm) events 
1 
are known by a person both internally and extornally .. 
Valuations , dreams , rationnl thought, omotions 1 and 
univcrsftls are all !.n COl1Sciousness s.nd arc l~owable. ~boy 
aro tho liltltorial of consciousness, alone with senno ... data. . 
i'he c&tesorlc:'! e.rG the :ror.11 ot: cooseiousness1 the biologieal 
orga.!r11&m is the source of consc 1 ousness. By focusing tho 
ettont1on und montul flmctions on psychic events, they can 
be class!fiod and 1ntorprotcd in the snmo malli~er as sense-
data. Tno only epistemological di£feronce is in tho ways 1n 
VJhich psych.lc &vents and so!'lco-data aro given, 
This knowledge of fnon-mo.torinl t events imt:ncdiatoly 
vaisos a problc~ in eonnoction with Sellers ' 1ns1stonco that 
only phyaice.l things are rea..l . The only solutions npparont 
to Sollars aro (a) to insist that "non- physicnl events" have 
~ 
an unseen physical o.spoct,~ or (b) to insist that "non-
physical events" are illusions . Sellars does both. 
It is not hard for SClle.rs to posit that tnon-physloal ' 
events have an unsoon physical .foundation; bocnuse hB has 
b.Gld exaet·lY that position in rego.rd to phyuical existents. 
Ue has continually na.intalr1od that tlle !:Jeing of a thing is 
not 11 known11 , although its natura can be inferred from the 
1 . EN, 302, 3C4 . 
2 . I:f "unseen" means "unknowablou, which Sellars would not 
admit if tho quest:.:ton were >osod in thoao torms, then 
epistomolo~1cal realism as a basis for physical monism 
loses all ~orca . Sellars~ howover~ doos admit, above 
(see pngc ~9, , so=othing so similar th&t a oor1ous doubt 
about hi~ rm~cr1s11om .is justified. 
2? 
sonse- dat it cnuses . 1 Consciousness is aware of only the 
contents or eonsciousn ss ; tho sources or these contents are 
nl ays inferrod. Sellar notes tho role of tho sense- organ 
as tho scarce of d to in concciousnens . Psycholor,y and 
bioloBY~ at the publication of Evol:1tionary )~n tur:~1!!E!· hed 
alrondy recorded efforts to 1aolnte particular conscio s 
processes in particular parts or the brein. 2 Al~o, about 
t his time , '"associ tion psychology11 ~ with 1 to idea of a 
physical connection or synapse or "motor- reflex arc'1 in tho 
brain for every ' association ', as onjoy1n a wide populari-
ty . Thus it as quito reasonable for Sellars to assume a 
physical occurrence in tho brain as the source of every 
"content" in consc!ousness . 3 
no vor, on an empirical bnsis , this a~sumption is not 
arr ntod. Emplriciem hero ~ould lead to a pluralism or a 
1 . Just whoro there is any difference bAt\ve n this view of 
Sollara 1 and Kant's Critique of Puro Reason is quite un-
clear, if any diffore co cx!sta at a!I . Did a· ·. "lt 
hold tho ' phonomonn • to be determined by tho di~ -~,-sich juot na firmly as Sollnrs holds t e data to be c~u~~!!y-­
dotorrninod by tho c:xiatont? Sollars doos cmphnsizo that 
the nature of tho existent can be inforrod; but thin la 
not diroct, certain knowledge . Sellars would declnt'e tho 
in!'orc:ncc to g i"o gonui e kn~ led-;e about tho thing an- s1ch; 
but his declaration is buttressed only by his corresr;n-
donco doctrine --- tho lntter cbarnctoriznblc over- s pl y 
ns abit of ol.iod , atl.tbborn faith. Thus the inference pre-
suppo~os tho limite.tions whlch Sollars imposes on nr 
•kno ledge ' and loaves tho ex!.s+-.r ,.,t; as unlmown as the 
dinfS::_en-slch. Soc bovo, par;o ~6. 
2 . :.~.'l>lOl'e ::t.s , fOr exv.mplo , ood ovt(( ... "lCC to bolievo t t in-
hibitions o.nd abstr ct thinkins-: e.re llctivitiee of (l . o ., 
dopondont on} the pre - frontnl lobee, that viau 1 seiiii"=' 
tiono are 1unct1ona or the occipital lobes, nnd that tho 
psycho3omntic effects of emotions on the body occur through 
tho medull a oblongata . 
5. EN, 2 , 283, 284, 298, 5081 3091 313, 316, 324 . 
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solipsism, since tho physical basis of brain ovents is un· 
soon. For Sollars, tho assumption is explicable in terms or 
his early allegiance to physical realism. Otherwise , thoro 
is a very serious question s to ghother or not the observa-
1 tion that consciousness is not oxpor!onced apart from brain 
is evidonco that the brain is the source of consciousness. 
The brain aa a necessarz condition may have been mistaken 
for tho brain as sufficient cond1tion. 2 At any rate, the 
insistence is clenr that every psychic evont is materially 
3 b !led. 
If the arguments of this chapter stnnd firm, we havo 
estnblishod the thesis that the living organism, 
when properly and ndequatoly conco!vod , includes con-
sciousness as a chnractor:tstic, i~ternal feature of 
tho functioning , nouronic system. 
or the brain 
physical 
An existential dualism of the tradi-
this contontual 
This trend is carried on, by Sellars , into hls descrip-
tion of solf-consciousnoss . Carefully avoiding idealistic 
1. Tlus obvious denial or extra- sensory perception and mys-
tical experiences of od emphasizes so llars • greater 
loyalty to physical ronliem than to empiricism. cr. 
discussion or illustCJn be low. 
2. "It may still be that the cumulu ti ve growth of the brain, 
its structural, functiona l and fund-montal identity, is 
the condition or self- identity within consciousness. Time 
as n growth ratbor than time as a moro lapoe--·the two do 
not conflict although tha first involves dooner insight---
is the importont interpretation of the brain- mi·nd . And it 
is thls ohnr~ctar of tho brain hich lnds its translation 
in tho cumulativa doonenin of consciollsness . " Jl"l, 171. 
3. EN, 235 , 315, 3~6, 319. 
4 . rrr, 315 . 
5 . E .. , 58. 
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solipsism, ho e.vers thn.t rmen the individual is "critical" 
of his knowlod~~ , he is conscious of h1~solf as nn organism 
rather than as just o. eon.c1ousneac. 'tThe self which domin-
ntes consciousr.ess is not th.G tholo cf the complex self."l 
.As consclousneos ls an out...,. owth of ncurnl devolopmont , 110 
solt-consciousness io another evolutionary step beyond con-
sc1ousnoso . 2 And evolution, !'or Sollars, includes tho com-
p lcte novelty of new lovols. Just how novel is self-con-
sciousness? 
}~ nkl~, it seems to ~ thut there is novelty of an 
undo~i~~lo sort at ever- lcvol of reality, but that 
hero [ in the~sychlc. 1] only are we on tho inside,. 
so to ~peak. · 
Thus the distinction botwoon knowlod~e of existenta and 
knowledge of psychic events ie cloarly made . 4 Psychic ovonts 
are given by tho structure of consciousness alone; although 
conscious thoughts, value-system, and purposes mny be contri-
buting faetoru of the structure of consciousness. Data are 
given from outside th'l lnd1vidua.l and arc not altered by in-
dividual systems of thought. To bo suro, data, to bo por-
coived. must ba put ·itl in tho categ ories by consciouonoss ; 
but tho cntogorios are 1n no ay individual, bein~ complete-
ly dotermiood by . a~ur and e.bcolutcly univcrsnl. l"an can 
i . liN , 2'16 . 
2. E'', 171 . Cf' . elao, "t n ••• may rightly assign value to 
the univerSO' ihich ••• is m uo of r.tuff which hnd the 
potential po :er to raise itsolf to self- conseiouanesa 
ln him. n EN, u43 • 
• E l, 19. 
4. lili, :324 . 
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know hit1::>~lf 1 1:'ltrospc-ctively, and can know tho nphysicnl 
realm11 by tho interpretation or senno - dnta . 
Cognition cs.n include "kno lec.lr·e" of othor mindts and 
their thoughtc and contents . Ho~ovar, tho mothod io simply 
a combine. tion of tho two ays or b.1owing do scribed in tho 
prtJceding pnro.g1.•aph . Careful speculation reveals the nature 
of an objoct as its bo~vior is perceived; so that hat goe s 
on ln the othor mind can bo in:.Cox•rod froc.a the p6rson ' s be -
bavior. And there is also communication through the meanings 
of such symbols as 
gesture , facial expression and langua ge . Such data 
of observation are pecul iar because they are 1ntar-
protod by tho observer as symbols of inner states of 1 conaclousnoss to which he cannot otherr:ise ponotr atc . 
tt ·;ha.t wo do is sym'!')athe ~..ically to reproduce tho montal ntato 
or our co:nmunico.nt, that is , o produce the !!Seaning of the 
symbol . n2 ~;o Sollars finds tb.nt 
thore are n t loA.st two gonoral kinds of kno led c or 
external objects of the human typo: {1) information 
about things and processes foundod on the study of 
tho pnttorn a!'ld quelitative diff~rencea of sense - data . 
and (2} knor1lodgo of thG contents of othor minds 
throur~ tho interpretati on of nymbols .3 
"It is no mo:ra dif!"ieult to know other minds than to know 
E~zs~~ t,hinp.:~ . But in both cases knowlodgo is mediate and 
not intuitional . n4 
If " thero aro at least two general kinds of knowlodgo of 
1. ,E-n .. , 30~ . 
.., EN, 303. ...., . 
3 . EU, 304. 
4 . E i , 305 . 
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external objects of the human type "1; thon empiricism demands 
a dualism of mind and body. A mind- body dualism would seom 
at times to bo accepted by Sollars . U1s own definition or 
crlticnl ronlism---"the mind can build up lmowledge about 
extra-mental roallties ••• thnt ••• cann~t be ~resented to an 
immod.late awareuoss'12---is just ae oo.sily e.ccom:nodatod to 
dualisil as to monism . 
Yet his metaphysical choice continues to override his 
dosire to bo empirical; 3nd to tho ond Sollars writes that 
0 c shall hold that consciousness is a functional expression 
or tho brain and so internal to , and continuous with, physi-
cal roali ty . r: 3 
Any event in consciousnoss which can not bo inforred as 
tho outgrowth of an occurrence in the physical world is held 
by Sellars to be nn illusion. In this •~ay , he accounts for 
ox·ror. But he confuses~ nt timos tho physical source with 
tho phyoicnl l~foronco . So that he rejects dreams, spirit. 
soul. v:ill, ond God on too baais thnt they do not refer to 
physical objects and cannot , therefore , bo roal . 4 Yet he 
.. r 
1. Ell, 304 . Also, "The critical realist hol ds , then, that 
v:o possoss two kinds o.f knowledge of another•s mind , and 
that thoso supplement ono nnothor . Tho first ot is 
knowlodgo of intelligent behavior gainod through obser-
vation. ••• There is , cecond , knowledgo or content 
throu~h assertion or identity . Thoso are what I meant 
whon J. cal leu my position tho double - knowledge tbflory . 11 
EN, 505- 307. Uote that Sollars says kinds not degree s 
of difference . 
2 . E'"~, 20 . 
3. En, sn. 
4 . EN, 197. 
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retains otnotion, valuation, and nbstrnet thinking on the basis 
that their source is in tho physical brain. 
35 . 
Logicnlly, thoro is a vory good possibility that Sollars 
ha~ horo co m1tted the fallacy or essuming tb~t a neeessnrz con-
dition of eonne!ouenocs (animal body} is tr~ sufficient condi-
tion (aoureo) of m1nd. 1 His reply would doubtloss be that 
eroat1vo szntbos!o is a suttieient condition for anything wo 
cnn observe . Ir asked, then, for e teet of truth, Sellars 
2 
could only naco •public veritication through pereopt1on• . 
Another segment of Sollar~• epistemology has been dotor-
minod by his motaphyaics . 
Improssod by the oxo.etnoss and certainty of ths n mp1r1• 
3 
ce18 sciences , Sellnro covots exact, verifiable, mathG ti-
eall:r cortain knowledge for all fi lds of thought, nnd tor 
4 philosophy L~ particular. Sellars follo ~ this tendency 
consistently, ns do tho Logical Positivists . nlthou~h he 
1. E!!, 235, 313, 316, 343. 
2 . At this point, Sellars may not poasib1y appeal to lo~1eal 
eolloronce or the 1nd1vidual'o perceptions (soe p. 1a, 
abovo), bocause creative am thesis bas just boon oont1onod 
as continually br!ng!nc new events and nct171t1os into 
boing. Logically, the consciousness would have no ay of 
deciding whether an e:xpcrionce, h.icb seems to occur rrom 
a fem111ar object but is inconsistent with pr vious exper-
iGnces of that object, is the roault of a tnulty previous 
concept or tho object or is tho rosult of a tcroati ve 
synthosin• , setting up novel a~tivities or tho object . 
The only confirmation read11y concoivablo would co~ from 
otbor minds, 1. e . , logical coher nco of a group 's exper-
iences . un:or€Un tely, communication or the f ct that two 
persons did or did not have tha same experience and the 
same knowlodge of an object would bo ultimately 1mnoss1ble, 
within Sellars' epistemology. 
3 . Et , v111 , s-a, 184~165• 179, 324. 
4 . EU, 214- 215. 
dooa not always soom a 1 ro ot its implicationo. Nor doos ho 
explicitly claim hia bolior that such kno lodge is possible 
1n philosophy. In turning r.volutionarz .Taturnlioll! to sci nee 
to answor all problema, S lars ::a a lucid spolmoman ror 
2 Amoriean oulturo or the fi.fteon yoars prococling 1922. J\cer1-
cano genorally, at this timo and for t onty-f1ve years follow-
ing, bel1oved thero woro no potenti 1 limits to ocientific 
kno.l d • 
Sollars , in boitlS empirical, is willing to admit the 
verity of any 8 sc1ontific knowlod~" · At this date, psycho-
logy was bog1nn1ng to boeomo a sc1enoo . i1h1lo Sollnra seems 
to bnve boon 1mproased with ataon•s "bohnviorism" more than 
with any otbor or his c ontemporary psrchologieta , tho "ompir i -
co.l lmowlod " ot oonociouanoas had to be dealt th. 
In taking tho position that all knowledge la cediated 
and intorrod, Soll ars shows the 1nfluenco or Kant's Critique 
of ~ro ReasonJ3 or psycboloJ1sts who hold $Uch things as 
conaeiousnoa , froo will, and ntal eff1eac: to be dolus1ons 
' 
and •ho strossod tho possi~llity or error; d o£ a definite 
roectl~n against naivo roali ts who assumod that physic 1 
1. fi!s is not at all surprising, since the Lo" ce~ Po~1-
t1viste themsolvea did not develop thoroughly tbe im-
plications or their p osition for t nty years after 
olut1onar{rNatural1sm aa published. 
2 . !to pub1Ica on date . 
3 . The mind contributes something to perception. 
4 . Eut nat mind contributes 1 conditioned, if not dotor-
mi :tOd, by the biological orgnn1sm. 
-z ~ 
\.) ) . 
1 
reality :!.u k.."'l0\7r. diroctly and without error . 
Cona:dorod :n toto. Sellers• epistemology in moro of an 
ocloctic ngercg~to thun ~t iD syatcmat1c. 
2 . Unification of tho Sc:oncon . 
7hile So llnr:> oxpa:lds "tho physical ronl!u.11 t o cover all 
.fields of knowledge2 t the scionco of Physic:! ia lcrt within 
itn traditional bounds . All the $Clonces are autonomous3 ; 
at times hCJ oven ndmits thoy study different kinds or real-
1ty.4 Ho\Y, thon, are tho sc1eucoo unifiod? 
~ ohr 's oloctron theory o! tho nto~ g ivos a ' phyRical ex-
planationt of chemical changes ; ~., it ~ascribes , in terms 
of tho known unifor:ni tios of physics , tho antecedent condi-
tions of chemical combination and dissoclation. Lilw\Vise , 
tho observed physical nnd chemical activities are used to 
doncribo what to.k3:: place in biological p .. •oce:lnos. 1{vrvos 
a~a parte of biological animals ; tho~ofor~ ner7ous actlv1-
ties aro deocribablo in biological torms . Emot ions aro now 
known to have bloc'!...omlcal a ccompanimento in t ho for m of 
o:xc:z•o tior1s f:r-cm Lhe du.c ~lass gl nd:!; the~ufor~ emo tions cnn 
bo g iven a biological 6xplanatlon. Conscious activities 
ca.nno;,; be carriod on after tho organlsw ceases to liva---ot 
1 . srric"' '!lturo ls oxpar lmenta1 e:nd cr ative , it may produce 
a faulty organism, whose porcoptlons are not to be trusted . 
2 . E I, 197, 235, S13, 319 . 
3 . EU, 531 . 
4 . E~J, SZ.5 • 
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least I'.Uch hnti not bean verified---and the ha~1s of them 
seems to be the brain. Since the brain can bo ae~n, .felt. 
measured, in nho'r't exiata physicn.lly; tho bra:tn can be des-
cribed physically, e.nd is a phys leal ev9nt. rnsofar as con ... 
aeious activities ara dopcndont on this phyr.~_cnl hrnin, thoy 
1 ' i ., """pont-.!' • 1 n_so are p:.:rys . ea..t. .... .., _..,
include \7hnt the sc!enco of physic~ hns to ~ay nbc• t tl o 
o lee tronic structure of tho n tomn of the brn1:::1, the wa.y tho 
atoms combine ~o fc!'m nolGcttlos, ·l:c oloctr:!.ca.l mtture of 
' 
norvo impulscfl and neu.rol. con octiona, and trc enor(!'1es in-
·"-olvcd 1n tt11 tho processes. 86 llc.rc t.7ou1d, then, rocogn1ze 
a py-r'amld o.r the sciences , T:lth Pby::-ica at tr...c bane , Chemia-
try, B'olor:y, nnd Bohavioriotic Pnyctolo"'y next , and tho 
"menta.l acicncentt nt tho top . Thas, by tho principle of 
emergence, ovary ovont ·:vould hn·;n aspects in all too levels 
be low it, though not noces£e.r1ly in tho level::: abovo . 2 On 
1 . "UcDte.! c.bilitie<l ere tho results of biological mutation 
and ure tho witnesses to typec of causal action in the 
brt\ln, not found elsowbcro c.t loY!fn• lovels . There is a 
mode of action of the ~rajn correcpond1ng to reasoning, 
to rc:ccocy, to purpot:o , to foro£ight." EN', 313. 
2 . EN, Z33 , 335.. Tho myst;cry of ernorgcncy is: post hoc ergo 
propter hoc •ni thout ~ropt<ir ~oc erpjo ,P :>ot hoc '" rlo·., can 
an:; lo-rtcr !cvcl ovcn\1 .t"aii tv MVC rm aspoct 0'~"'~ f.1 hi3h0r 
l ovol,. when all h.:.gher level ovonts tlro held to omergo, 
cnuoa.lly, rr"Cii.ltbe lo'::'Or levels? If ;.t ·he answ~n cd nwh1le 
for s. son to have a !' thor :necessitc.tos tho father's 
'lavi g a ~on, it docs not ruoan t.hat c.11 t,r.l{l unc l e s have to 
ha·ve sons", tb.en \',"ha t t1aken t 10 selection? If causal do-
termi!'lncy , then t.hare should oo no eo lee tlon; the ac tiv1ty 
should bo univorsnl . If tho selection is random ("Nature 
i c\pGrimontal and creative .''} then t o hold tbc..t o.~cc tho 
sc,laotlon is made the rost is causally determinate, is to 
loc!\, tho barn door v..fter tho causally-de t~r'lllina.tc :1orso 
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t}'\.J.a. bnn1tl ~ no ttlttor h® h! h t lovo 1 or the autonomous 
oe!.o co,. tbo objoot of 1 ta otudy !.o poc1tod to have "pb;;s1ealu 
aapceta. Aceord! "lJ, collar tel~e the otnndpo1nt that 
Phyn!ec un1f1os nll oe1oneo bocnuco all otbar scioneos aro 
beeea on 1t and ult1mot&1y "o~l ined" by 1t.1 ~11a 1s. un-
quoat1o bly, 1n ,conplate ccord itb his contcnt1on that ell 
roal1ty is phy 1cnl. 
Thlo unitication on tbo bas1e of phy 1cs is not uimpl , 
ho~vor. s llnra contends that psychology doos study :lO 
~ 
thtn:; di~.roront tha.n vl'l.y!;1C3 dooo~, tha~ :Jticka and otonos 
do not undorgo cotr)lc:tos or oootions , n:xi that poycholo 1 hGo 
ito own cu"'a r~norotn itt 11:: utonomous. U'nfortuMtoly, the 
lttttor clauno i~Dl~oc t!lat aoacriptiOnD _n tormn Of pbyoieD 
aro not a,l "C'!f:J co~loto nnd adoquata doscript!.ons; nnd thnt 
•explanations' in to1.--mo or phyo1cs nro not alwa.ya comploto 
nnd adoquate cr.plQnations. 
SOlla~a ~oto th1e d1fE1culty by doeler1nz that r.o 
'orgnn!zntion'~ on one lcvo1. givoe 1 .. ioo to ovcnts on the next 
' !a-'Iong gono . 
Porb.aps Si)llo.rs !,a us1 ,. tt10 d1fferont def1nit1ono ot 
1cnunon : (1} an1 oor1cc de up or antocodent.-eonsequ.ent 
oocurl'Oneoa, o.nd (2) tbFl irrosiatibla ntocodant which 
:fOl:'coa ito concoquont to occur. His fa1l\tro to diot1n-
gu1 h, 1n rogard to c~uso. tooen neeeannry condition 
and eufficiont c~nd1'ttO'ii'1lau boon noted above. 
1 . "I would 3AY thot , 1n a vary roal eenao, all ~oioncos arc 
phytJical. t a1nco r~ hnvo not yet shown that mind 1e 
o. pby ic 1 category, \10 ahall not atrn1n tho roedor'B 
pationco . ••• iology 1c s =uob a pbyo1cal ec1enoo sa 
1.., phy:-ioa . It studio t stru.ctur0 nd bohnv1or or 
ornanic bodioo hieh aro ovolvod bodios wi~ npoc1rto 
p!•oportion not found at tho inornnnic lovol. •t Er::t, 100- 191. 
2 . m, e1s, 319. 
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higher lcve 1~ nnd that nn nctiv! t:r on one level is alt"lays the 
l f'U!'lcti~n or a structure or tho :no:tt lower lovol . E. c ., tho 
physical ttrrango:r.;cnt of o lectrons in an a tom or holiuro, cal-
ciun. or cnlori:1o d.:. tc:"'lllines their chct:1icc.l pro,,<:rtios of' 
co ll:J.lcsc .. ro su ltlng 1n tho growth ot the plant . i~llch f.'Ork 
ho.::: teen donG l-:1 bc!'-...nvioris Lie psycholouy l-o .;;llc>.l that 
stor.mc'h co~trn.cti::M re~ult in hunr;<-n" pf\ng~, that fetigue 
end sb.ock ero cl:.omicals in t..'1o bloodstream, and that extra 
edronalin i:n ~he olood is t. o basis oJ' iJhe sensations o:f 
The events o.i' tho next 1ieher level \7hlcb o.rise from now 
orcanlr;at1.ons on thn 01 o le-~e1 arc unpredictable, thn~ is, 
2 nc~:e 1 . T~lC7 aro c ansod ·) r t:lO nc ! s true tu!'O, but their 
nuturo il: not de tcl'minou !n any 1:1ocha:.'l:'i.cnl ·.:c y . The fact 
that matter functiono in nCs\7 wa!'"S at now level~, of organize.-
tion jus ·~ :tf'lca t.h.e aut.onony of tho ~clcnc<•s of' tho various 
levo~s . r:ho assorticn tho.t the now f-.mctiona o.ro "cnusod" 
by st~~ctures of lowor levels justifies~ ror Sollars, the 
unificntion of the sc:lencea within ?hyaics . 
1 . ~.~J , 205~ 283-284~ 315, :329, 339 . ttour eonclasion is tho.t 
orgnn:zat:ou is objectively sie.nlficant and ~&usally of-
i'octivc . Fu ... Ylct1on r.nd struc turo go together e.t evory 
1o"::"o l. :F'nnc tic·n is bvt the active ohaso of atruc ture .. 
In no other ny can wo interpret evolution and bring mind 
e_1<l body together •• , I~ , ~34 . 
2 ., EN, 261, 335 . 
However, it ic ,·;oll to rornambor whRt ''cnunon monns f or 
SalJ.nrs : nothinp n!Ot'G th&.n 11 trnccnb1.e sor:monco , or contin-
uity. In fe.ct , Sellar::; ,.ery seldom vrritos or ncauso" , pro -
ferrin ~ tc 0 oxplnin'' t :.nr-:s :n t.OI'!'W of' "t;m"~otic col"lt.i.nuityf . 
'lf£1C'1 ncturd joh of' un:.ry1n;- bol.:mgn to .?hilosophy, Sollars 
wculd s~y1; but Lho mntori"'l ·"o be :.ml;'iod io a':lppl:!.EH by tho 
scioncos, not by nhilorop:1y. Tho nciencen are a:rutono111ous in 
The co!"l.clus!.on to be :ren<.led, tht)n, iu tb.n.t Sellars seoks 
to U..'lify the sciotl<!OS within Physics h:J pointing out, oome -
whero in tho anc.ettl"y of oach o jcct o scie 1tific study, n 
physicnl nspoc.t of the obj ct or soma ancestor o~ the object. 
E . ~ ., i~ the science of mathomatics the properties of perfect 
un1vera~ls lika the circle are studie d . Yet Sellars, in an 
Ex1ntentialist ~oment, holds that universals ~rc conotructed 
from the mass or remembered porcoptions or, o . ~ ., round 
-2 th1nr;s . 4nd 1:-.neh p0rception"' have tho physicc.l t.specte of 
s~n'"c -date. n:nd o:!' p'':.y::~ienl refcrcnco or co'!'roosnondence . 
Erpo, mu thez:m. tics is a physice.l science . 
ily intc::·cetod in the epic tcmolo,..,.ict;;l que st.:.on, "Ii' there is 
1." Prof : Phillip F':'t;rk has agreed thc.t 'tphllooo;.hy ts tho 
ho.ndrna!~ of sclcnccH, in an ttddro ss to the Boston Un1-
vor:Jt ty Pbilo-::cp""' .. lco-1 Cl'..tb in April , 195~ . Se llar~ tould 
applaud heartily. 
2 . EN, 26 , 38, 3e. 163. 
an acting connection between consciousness and body, how can it 
bo kno~n?", rQther than in tho metaphysical intricacies of the 
natures o£ mind and body substancea . l In the proced1ng dis-
cussion or Sellars ' epistemology, his theories of the methods 
of knowin mind nnd body h vo been ~urvoyed. Those 111, then, 
largely dictate hie ansror to the mind- body problem. 
Sollarfj prefaces his om discussion or the problem in 
question ui th an historical rovio of other mon' a solutions . 
Ho mentions four approaches to tho problem. 
The fir~t approach is l'rom the stand that thoro is no con-
nqction at all bot eon mind and body, bacause they nrc or such 
differins kind9 of reality t t mutual influenco is 1mposs1blo. 
Sellars \-;astes very littlo time on this position, assorting 
th t nobody has be lievod this since Desce.rte s' time, nyway . 
In u way, the scholastics did hold that body and sotll are in-
separable and cnpablo or nopnrnto oxintonces. 'lt hether 
they culd agree to Sellars' chnractorization of their thought 
ie questionnble . 
The approe.ch of "parnlle llsm" i"' considered noxt . This 
notion of tho tr~ind-body relAtion is that t o pnro.llel series 
or cvcnt:1 occur' in mind and body; but neither series has any 
t) 
oftect on tho other . ~ 3Cilrtos 1s crodi tocl with tho origina-
tion of this vio ~ . 3 The f ct that DoRcartes rocoenizod an 
interaction of mind and body, even though ho could find only 
1. ~rm. 
2. , 293 . 
3 . EN, 289. 
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the flimsy explanation of the "p:tnenl gland" for it, seems to 
have been overloo~rod by Sollnrs . Novortholoss, tho position 
of Parrllellsm is doflned. 
nnd 
000 
Thirdly: 
To 
Like ~etophysicnl parellolism, interact1onigm 
has boon a du,listic theory :::Ja.intalning that mind 
(or ~oul) o.nd body nro two di.~tinct kinds of exis-
tences which yot 1ntorect in perception a.nd voli -
tion . rr:.f~re ls wrdly less or the dualistic tr~d1-
t1on in interact1on1sm than in parolle11am. But it 
is more r""')ust end conf:t..dant -on the mental side . 
?ho champions of tho soul refuse to make it a more 
translator ar;<l shado·r. of tho alien physicnl doa1o.ln . 
I respect the interactionist £or this stoutness ot 
conviction . It uill >T.ring coneoes1ons from the 
sciontl~t, though the refo~ulaticn or natu~al1sm 
~Y not please tho i~toractionist mo has mystical 
yearning:; .. 
'.'io must QiSting>.lish tho neta.physlcnl type of 
intcraction1st ~ho po3tulatos two kindn of ox1s-
tenee from tho paycbolo-ical typo wb.o oochows 
metaphysics and is ch:le fly i:ntercotod in tt'o ques-
tion of the efficacy of con.::ciousnoso. y;hon we 
diseuse intorttctio:n in this cbe::>tar, \1e shall mean 
tho p~sition th~t strcssos a flat distinction bo-
tv1oen mind and body o.nd yot holds to a caues.l rela-
tion between them. Such intaractionists believe 
in the soul as so~othin which overflows the body. 
~hey are animists and vitalists. Thus a belief in 
the orricacy of conseiousooss is n~t enough to 
label a thlnkor an lnterectionist. 
Spin6za is attributed tho Doublc;~l'J.spoct Theory of mind 
body . 2 That Spinoza hnpponod to speculate o•1 Go d as tho 
substu:nee of !Vhich :mind nnd ma.ttor are aspects is an un-
nnr;:>a.n.ted rn:ystlcism, to Sollars ;. Uevarthelass , the double-
n3pcct thoory does involve a metaphysical monism, known in two 
different ways---that ls , with an epistemolocical pluralism. 
I . EN, 2~ . 
2 . :mr, 259. 
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Sollar!: has a groat deal o!' s~p thy ·"Jith such system, 
sinco lt ~uld nllo~ tho monism ho clings to and nlao would 
ellow tho epistemological plur lism his empiricism urges . 
From his historical survey, Sellars concludes that mind 
and body croate a problem only !or n tr.\3t;nphynical dunli~t . 1 
Sellarn does not 3olva th 1~d-body problem. lie dis-
solves lt . If the relation of ind and body is a problom 
only for dualists , then a iople affirmation or monism ~111 
2 
erndicnto tho problem • 
. bat should e rno n by mind? Is it the same as con-
sciousness, or is it sooethin~ bo~nd up Y.ith conscious-
ness and manifesting itself in consciouonoss but yot 
not eroly consciousness? These are not e ay ques -
tions , but t y have tho virtue of being fairly speci-
rlc . If t•e can ans or them in accordance with the 
drlrt indicated, tho traditional mind- body problem 
will disappear, to be replaced by such empirical 
questions as concern the gonosis or types of behavior, 
the varying capacities thDv reveal, the nature, status 
nnd role of conaciousneso . 3 
Tho scionco of behaviorism ostublishoa oind na a 
physic~l category gro in" out of the data of obiorvn-
tion, nd so fnr thoro is no rnind- body problem. 
not until conaci(>USneas in seon to bo included in tho 
brain ill tho term mind coase to bo a bi uous and 
tho nee -old problern vnnish in tg ~ore adeouate con-
ception of tho living organism. 
Aftor all, "a psycholo ithout a soul can scarcoly be said 
1. Note oll in tho follo ing pages that Sollars hns rojocted 
oll previous solutions on a metaphysical basis, but he 
establishes his o~n solution on a purely epietomolo~ical 
basis . Ho doen not mention this shift of approach and 
does not justify it. 
2 . ~he thor tho affil•ma tlo:'1 is j 1s t.ified or justifiable is 
not answered by mere . affirmation . 
3 . ID1, ~98-299. 
4 . ... , 301. 
5 . E i , 307. 
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to ho dualistic in the tradi tiona 1 sonse . nl "noas not the 
dunliom seom to be an illusion duo to soma woekness in ap -
proach and formulation , to be confusedly verbal rather than 
rea11n2 
As stated above , Sellars ' fidelity to the rnonlsm of phy-
sical realism ls unshak&cble . HoV!·over, hi a tempirici sm ' 
forces him to ocknowledgo so~o aspocts of ronlity not ordin-
arily conniderod physical. 3 
Tho :psycbicc.l is a natll.ral 1n~red1ont of the brain 
at these lovols and its function is to aid in the 
solution of ~roblems by tho cues it affords . Con-
scionsno .. a literally "n.sists the brain to meet now 
situations . we must ,rasp this prlilscnce of conscious-
noss in a non ... due.llstic ay . • •• 
·co must enle.rge our conception of the physical. 4 
C:onscioucnos s is (1. .runctionnl c:o:preas1on or the br ain 
and so internal to , and c ontinuous with, physical 
rco.11ty. • • • An o.:1 stential dualism of the tradi-
tional t ,e is not 1ust!r!oa ;v tn!s contentual 
cornp ox ty of the br& 
"Critical roalis~ undermines natural dualism."0 
The pa.::-ticul ar typo of cont1nuity7 conot~tu.ting ~e llare' 
8 ~onisrn of mind and body is round, upon carefUl oxaminsti on , 
1 . I.tl, 289. 
2 . E!f, 291. 
3. EJ, 197, 235 , 319 . 
4 . :.:!'1, 313. 
s . ~ r, ~c. 
6 . lt ' 000 . 
"1 . ' Continuity ', .. oanin~ difference o.f degrao rather than 
dif.f'e!'Cl'lCO of kind . eellc.r~ lee:n!l bnavily 00 thiS hidden 
connotation of tho ~ord, oven after having defi nod 
''contlnu1t;;11 na :more rclctodnoss . 
a. Ir1 d1acues1ng and rojocti.ng other solutiona of the prob lem 
under invcstigaticm, So llar!3 outlines tho dualiam of body 
and soul . In h is own approach to the probl em, So llars 
nover\iS'ea "soul" but sticks to 1'm!nd", to vhich ho gives 
a verr special dof1n1tion almost synonymous with conscious-
ness .. 
45. 
to consist of nothing moro thnn "eonatic continuity" . 1 That 
is to sny, that since tho courso of tievelopmontal change 
takes plnce along an unbrokon title continuum. that mind 
thorefo:-o "ari~o!:" from matter and ifl "continuous" wit.h 
mattor. Mind arises nntnrr..lly within matto1 .. : 
J•ontal ablli tics e.r<:~ the ro3ul ts of biolo t cal 
nutation and aro the witnesses to types of causal 
action :!.n the bro.1n , not fo•md elsewhere at lower 
levels. There 1s a mode of action o~ the brain 
corrosponding2 to reasoning , to rnen1ory , to purpoEe , to foresight . 
That instinct is the expression of or7aniznt1on is 
tho conviction of both b1olo, ists and po,Ychologists . 3 
I boliove that consciousness is an irruption so £ar 
as ito :1ovclty !n coneorned, but not as regards its 
gonotic cat::'ix and coi..litions. He who denies this 
as 3ort1on of o:s!Jo!'ltinl cont1nu1 ty m lS t mnints.tn that 
only consciousnoas cn.n produce co11aciou~noss. 
Tho critical naturalist of t 10 prosont seeka to 
locate mind and consciousneaz in nature by roco -
n.:~1n0 their uniqueness nnc'l spatial llmitations. 
••• And ho bolievos t~~t evolution and crlticsl 
ronlism c:.1ablo him to acco~tpl:i.sh this desirable 
tnsk. Evolution, beceuse of t~e ~umission or levels 
in nature; c1•1 tical realism, bcio.uue of 1 ts recogni-
tion or two kinds of k~owlodge. ' 
~~e conclusion draffil from such rcasonin ts that lnd is a 
function or mattor . 
1 . 0Genotic continuity" nllows tho metaphysical pluralism 
~hich Sellars actually believes in and denies only on 
the basis of n blind faith in physical monism and of 
"genetic continuity" .. 
2. Ell , 313. 
3. F.U, 333. 
4, EN, 2t.~s . Althou-_,b. me.n:r hilosophero, probably e. majority* 
have ma~ntalned exactly what this last sentence suggests, 
ncllnrn does not seriously consider this a ~ossibillty. 
6. EN, 324 . If thoro aro two kinds of lmowledgo, why not 
two kin.ls of objects of knowledge? 
4::) . 
To antieipnto our leter, oro detailed ar nt, e 
shall hold that consciousness is functional expres-
sion or the brain and ft~ intern 1 to, nd continuous 
nith, physical reality. 
It io just becauso consciousness 1a not a second 
nubstance outsido the brain but a varient w:t.thln 1 t 
tbnt it can act ns tile focus and instrument or func -
tional adjustment • • •• In think1n~ , Dlanning and 
desit•ing---in all those conscious proceases which e 
call activities--- o sr~ on tho inside of the brain 
and at its focal levol of ope2ation. He re objective 
and subjective activity ot . 
"Tho unl verse ••• is made of a tuff which had tho potc ntial 
polior to raise 1tseli' to self- con ciou:Jne~s in hiT"' [ "'tPJ."3 
Lest it bo assumed that tho process of 1ntegratin~ mntter 
into con2ciousness ia autom tic or mechanical, Sellars hastena 
to add: 
y ~akinG form an objectively significant chnrnctor 
or matter we have odifiod blind necessity and inocu-
lated it jth m1 d . Integration is a variable in 
nature but an otroctivo v rin lo; and, as a have 
fretpently pointed out, '!r~tolligonce41s a function of tha b1 G~t level Of into rntion. 
Consciousnoss ••• is quality of a novel hole, and 
is ns nove 1 as the synthetic whole of' ·•'llch it is 
an expression. I h ve roquently ca1.led 1 t a variant 
to bring out sts oxis entinl correlation r.ith 8 com-
lox :rocess . 
ihen the notion of ngenetic continuity" ia examined cere-
fully, there comes to v1o• the 1~e that continuity is Just 
as easily traced throu~h a chnn 6 in 1 velo a3 throu&l changes 
w1.thin oro levol . Ide lly, ell t e sciences, cooper t1vely, 
could start with rive atom n trace its continuous 
l. · .. J~, 58. 
2 . E ", 31:3. 
3. E , 343. 
4 . EN, 339 . 
5 . EN, 316. 
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existence; t hrough its ootlblnat,ion wi·th othtn• stoms into a 
molecule; through the integra. t1on or the molecule into a 
11v1n~ cell; the cooperation or ce ll , t~lasue , and organ lnl;o 
a living orcanl3m; and tho gro :~tll nnd development of the 
organism from a bald, to0thloss, aomi .. conaclous infant lnto 
a wiso, self-controlled, self-conscious , eth.:.cal, aesthetic, 
social, hlX'7l::L"1 odult.. Tho original atom should be still 
prese lt; tho observed Conservation of l7.?.ttr.n' Gi vee assurance 
it has not beon dostroyod. rr this atom 1o ~till present. 
a.ny thinlror would agree that it is the same o.to!!l; it bas re,.. 
tained its ldontity. Yot it has partlclpatod in many changes . 
Che.ngin~ l do,ntitz io an essential phns3 of ' genotlc con-
tinuity • ~ In tho traditional use$ of thcoo i;or.as, a •ch&nging 
idontity 1 is r•oughly anr.lo;;o~z to a squaro circle . As might 
bo o:xpoctod, ::io lla:r·s change s tb.o moa.."linga of' so1ne of the 
words ha uses . Ti1.e criterion of kno-:~ing identity boars a 
rolation to tho criterion of vor1dical kno~ledge of an object. 
If an oojoot is continuingly porceptlble1 as the same object, 
2 then ita continuing identity is verified. Thus, if an object 
chnngoo color, shape, size, and texture, yut t+Otains ito rola• 
tlve poaitioo within the field or vision and in consciousness , 
! . Purception is the recognition of sense - data in their 
pa.tte1~n . RocoRJ]itlon requires a ai.r;nificant sameness of 
data-experience . 
2. Ill" .. O.l.Jh Sellai'B neglects to cons ider the case, it is aa-
sumod that a comolete instantanooua change in the appear-
ance of an object would bring 1·orth th o judgmont that tho 
orig inal object had vanished and anothor substituted for 
it. 
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Sellar$ would say it ha.s retained its identity throurh 
chnnc;e . 
For Sellers , identity of an objeet deponds on constunoy 
in space and ''duration" only. !).lra.t.ion is tl-le conscious 
impr•osoion cr the passage of' time. HO"V70VOr, since •·reel 
t..ime iu change 111, cor~s~alfc.l: in time v;:..~ld be a nclf-contra-
ci!..ct.ion, and laneuage lffiO.lys::.n thus rn~ovos that ldont:ttx is 
~~lfillod w!~n an objoct is constant ln space ulone . 
In autn:1a.ry, ~ollnrn ' completed .fo1->r.1Ulntlon a.ppoax•s: if 
s.n object romainu const:tnt in space, its ~ontinu:tty and 1dcn-
tity nro nssurod. iTo ne.ttot- Vihat activities it ene;ages in 
nor what higher levels ornergo out or2 it nor what changos 
happen to it; it rotains a t"" .. ota:!)hyr-ic;-;1 idon t::.tx so long as 
it can bo knom1 as the sam~ object. Sellars ' lfsolut1on'* t o 
the mind-body problem is an eplotemoloa1ca.l ~"re. 
A thing cho.ngca vrhen ono or more of its perceivabl e 
o.r.pects l1as e!t'lor disap enr~d. or ven ole.ce t o new 
once . Such rnoJificetlo s e.re compatible \71th our 
idoa of thin~ because it is th9 ~~Y we e~r1ence 
things thnt; dotcrnines our idec.o . 'l'his approach 
enables us to show the nbsurdity of tho old query. 
How can o. thing change and yet remain the samo thin§? 
It is tho rsco~nized nature of the thins to change . 
!. :o!tf, !~!. 
~ .. Or uaro built on top of11 ? A acrrious question of p-r-o -
postt icns nri!les hero : who thcr hlr1'. er lcv~l:! a:re r;oncr-
atod bz lower le~els or arc cenernted from the lowor 
l cvo 1:> . Is n st:-uc t1.U"e to be "bt•il t o'£'"13'r.tc ks or 
trgonorntod byu brich-n ? Sollers does well in stres s ing 
tho import.a:ncc cf' t~:e fact or. orgsn.tz:1U.on, l"ut l1e 
complotoly 1gnoroo the q1.1estion of the origin of' orge.ni-
:-;u+.ion, except fo!' as::mtnin,.. tht\t higher leV(\lS •natur-
ally • ~iso out or tho l owor . 
3 .. EN, 14-f.l . 
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A phy3icol thing is the p~oduct of ito history. The 
organism is a striking case or this ca~lativo inte-
gration in .vn.ich tho past lives on into the precent 
as a structure able to functi~n dltferontially. Time 
ninks into spnco, es it were . 
'f'..oca.uso the ln•ain can bo locc. ted in apuco, c.nd because 
consciousness cnnnot bo '"Jer1fic1' apart from n biologically 
2 
active bro. in, all ccnociou=ncs~ nnd ra.ti onul! ty omcrgo from 
1 t .follo-.ring a 'tsor:o tic ccntinui t.r' of progrc :30 from level 
to h!.ghcr lc vo 1 . 
But ovolution deals with cuoulativo change ~nd nith 
ne•T who'!.ott rising on ~1c intima to combir:w. tion of 
rcco-.;orablc , yo t for the "!:.i!!lo chc.nged, parts . Shall 
we say that such a progression !nvolvos d1sc;o:.tt1nu1ty? 
11' •:o moan by dlscont1nuity ::lOVolty. yos . But it 
this !w·.rolt;y grov.:o noccssurily out of tho si t1.1a tion, 
i:; tl": .. e:::·c not aloo :;he ocsontinl r}f' ccnt:!.nui ,y? Otbcr-
r:!so , c or:tinui ty maans idor. i,; it::; and tho postulate 
con.:':"lic t::. \"llth the obvioun i··lc t of c~1nngo . 3 
This typ\) of description is held by Sellar:; to oxpla ... n and 
justify tho chs.ruc teri:at.i on 0f all reality an c. ph:rsical 
monior.J . 
My argumont is tbat pa~ticular tirlngs aro co~plex, 
but that this complexity doas not require a U..'11f1er 
because it is not a plurnlistic ccmploxity or a 
logical sort . It is a complexit;r .:h:tch corresponds 
to otn~ idoa of sy~tom. In othor words, the physical 
thing un:t:.rlos itself, much as our !111nds do, throur.;.h 
immanent procossos . Tho ide~tity, or unity, of a 
thing does not conJ'lict wlth it.s com;>le.xity. 4 
<{ ·~· • I "I· ~ 5 J.. . ;i;t'f ' 33~-.)3 • 
2 . Having describod omorgonce, Sellars writes: uin no othor 
wsy ct.tn we intorprot evolution and brlng roind and body 
toge tho1• . u (EU, 334 . ) Note that emergence is an 
hypot'lesia to o;r.pl.o.in that ihJ.ch is ornp :ft~:tc 11y obser-
ved; yet it is also a~surnod ns Ct. knovm fact which :nroves 
' ~rc.nct1c ccntinuity '. 
3 . EH, 235. 
ci . EN' 139. 
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The naturalistic viow Vhich l am going to develop 
ha~ as yet no successfully definitive name . It 
h olds to the effective prosonce of consciousness 
as a nAtural ingredient of functioning cortical 
systems. In one place in my writings I have called 
it tho unity• thoory; but that expression cells 
attention to only one side of the position, viz., 
tbe denial or tho trnditional dualism. 
F:rorn e.nothnl' nnr.; a, lt ~en be deaic.."latod a critical 
dcvolopmGnt of tho doubla - n.spcct thoory, a develop-
oont rounded on ·critical rea.l ism. There is com-
plo~ity in tho brain itself. It is a ~~ub~~~knowlodv,o 
theorz OXJH'(·ssive of this unique co ..... ploxft'y . 
4 . Emphasis on Evolu.tion . 
The preceding section gives a hint of th6 ~ay in which 
Sollars • materialistic decision determines his emphasis on 
evolution. As the other sciences 1'1nd lncroasin ly def1n1to 
and positive evidonce or the reality of t~1ngs other than 
1nort mattor, it becomes incroaslngly difficult for tho 
materialist to redueo all reality to matter --- or, !_!! 
Sellars, ~o expand •matter ' to include all ronlity --- and 
maintain a consistent position. Sellars 1s unable to build 
a systeno.ntie · hilo.so hy of ma.ter1allstic monism because or 
tle aps b.o leaves bet\.ccn levels . 2 Tr..o only real connec-
tion he citcn ia the fact that ·tho higher lovels e~('lrr;e from 
:t. " ' 29J . 
2 . :chernicul properties are not the senn as physical proper-
ties . Thorn :!."' a f'U't 1or lus when we examine the runc-
t1onint::" of or nic tissues . Tho older properties are 
tra.nor::ondod and 1ncludod. And b-9havlor1sm is s\Jggeating 
that still more synthotie level is reached in the ner-
vously controlled action or the whole organism. " EN, 297. 
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tho lo,o:-. 1 This assumption of evolution is the basis of his 
doctrine of gonotic continuity. Tho proceding section pos-
tulated th&t 11gonot1c continuity" is Sellars • answer to the 
mind- body problem. Therefore , evolution is essential to his 
reply to the ~ind-body problem. 
Sellars' unification o£ the sciences is quite dependent 
on the evolution or the subjects of all other sciences from 
the matter studied by Physics . 
Evolution, in descrlbin tho connection anu inter-con-
nection of vnrious typo3 of roality, allows eomplote empiri-
cism in knowing reality t ou:h different methods and ith 
.._, 
different der~oes of cortainty.u That such an empiricism is 
demandod by Sellars has been 111US era. tod in di3CUSSin his 
postulate of tho autonomy of tho sciences . It has nlso boen 
sug sted that devotion to •empiricism• is one of Sellars' 
primary principles ; the evolution which facilitntos achieve-
n:nnt of empiricism bocome3 o.f _oat impox•tanco. 
Theao tbroo facets of his thought ehow how Sellars • 
allegiance to physical realism detercines his emphasis on 
evolution. It might be said that evolution 1s the means to 
1 . ellars, himself, is open to n~~o 's rebellion against 
EOBt hoc or~o propter hoc. at this point. Hume would 
oay £fiat It rs not vnifa to assume causation or any 
other nocossary connection just because the "higher 
levels" eppoar later in time than t e "lower lovels" . 
Yot Sellars believes, with no other reason apparent, in 
tho .sausn,1;_ neeoss 1t¥ of emergent evolution . £!.!_, !S.!..• 
Eli, 265, 283. 
2. Then hy ot allow di.fforent tests of truth, thAt is , 
different methods of vori.fic tion? It ·~~ld seem that 
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tho end of "physical monism" . 
s . ~ejection of God. 
The existence of any disembodied spirit is tmpossiblo 
in a cosmos or. metaphysical matorial monism. In this fact , 
Sollars ha~ a basis for rejecting God, as traditionally con-
1 
coivod in our culture ; and ho proceeds to do so . 
All his argumonts against God are negat!ve and condi-
tional proofs; accordingly, he develops several arguments to 
give more credence to his position. 
Tho first argument mi ht bo called an 11o trylogical 
argument against God". It is simply to the affect that, 1f 
all o.xlstenco is physical, then God, as a disembodied sp i r i t , 
is impossible . 2 
Tho next ar ;..umcnt might bo cnllod o.n ttapistemolog.ical 
arg'U.l'l]ent against God11 • Who Sollars writes, "Let; it bore-
membered, first of all, that nll 1~10 lodge arlso& and exists 
3 
only in the consciousnoas cf 1 dlvlduals . u , he could be 
understood n3 not hnv1ng God in mind at all . But hen 1t is 
rocallerl that Sellars has recognized conaciousnosa only as 
an epiphenomonon---or an emergent lovel--·of msttor , and 
Sellars expanded nt~e pbysice,l roalrn" in some directions 
but not in others . 
1. Tho other possible course of notion woul d bG to rel1n~ 
qui~h the phy~ical monism. To Sellars , that is unthink-
able . 
2 . EN, 2~8 , 303- 304 . 
3. EN, 30~ .. 304. 
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tha t t he 11 ind1v1dua.lo 11 he speaks of must have fleoh- and- blood 
bodies ; it 1s oecn t hat not only i s cosmic i~tell1gence re -
jected, but also any type of a non- car.al finite God i~ . 
The coup de 'Frace is t hen ,..i v~n to even t he Groclc typo of 
uupor1or- ucan SJCl , ao Sellars uri teo: 
J 'row of no c city of the mind \"lh1ch uill enable 
1 t to predict evolution . To do so, 1 t liould have 
to ~reate anticipativoly . The hu~n mind discovers 
by empirical i nves tigation what nature bas already 
accompl 1ohed. It proceeda from otago to stage a fter 
na.ture .l 
Sellar s is very de cidedly against anything supernatural ; and 
hi s ep ote-olo~1cal oyotem certainly obvia tes a.ny lmowledgc 
of t he supernatural . 
A coroll~ ry of the ' epistemol ogica l a r gument' is Sel ars ' 
argum nt £roo communi cation. 
It is no ::nero d1 f ficul t to lt Ol'l other minds t han to 
kn0\7 ohyoice.l t hings. But i n b~th ca'les lmowledge 
is oedia te an ~ot intuitional . 
: ote t ha t I say ltnoul edge of and not pa.rticip .. tion 
i n . hat \ie do 1.: .,yn~a.tbet1cally to reproduce tho 
ment a l state of our commun1cant . 3 
Since communication is a matter of i nf e rence from oonsc -
perceptions ; it i s obvious t hat communication uith an imper-
ceptible (non-~~te rial ) Being i o impossible . God , ao tradi -
t ft onall y conceived , is t hus denied. 
1'heist1c met n.phyc ics i s paaood off bccauoc it is "anthro-
pomorph1c" , 
1 ,. ~N , 332 . 
2 . ;~ , 305. 
3 - ::N, 303 . 
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this uncritical e~tonsion of w111, purpoao and 
caprice . The sci~ntiot is eonvineod that spirits 
and eoula furnish no 1ntoll1g1ble explanation of 
events. Let us call thia first mode or explanation 
animism. ••• Thi~ QOdo orl oxplanat1on is the 
eeeeneo of supernatura11am. 
Tho last important nt a ainst od 1!1 a ••toloolo-
g1oal ar nt"s that because there 1s not a particular kind 
or purpo o obvious in tho evolutionary process, there is no 
2 
eosmio purposor---no God . Tho argument 1s valid against an 
omnipotent , omniscient God who 1 t ntly accomplisho ·1s 
purposoe, and who w~~ld be ass od to will the goal~ to rd 
. 1eh &voluti oo soc~ half-heartodlj to bo moving. Ot' r -
13e1 the conclus ion io o~ly an argument from 1 oranee . 
Tho weakno a ot this enoe is pointed up by the quotation: 
0 rw1n1s~ challe~~od tho assumption o~ dos1 in 
naturo bJ a costing a natusal genosi tor what had 
been interprotod s dos1gn. 
Thor is nothin in C!! llars ' ~ def1n1t1on of nature that 
supports a dichotomy bet en nt1turo o.nd cosmic purposo; and 
~ 11 ra seems to havo tor otton that ho b.o.s 1neludod at loast 
the limited purposes or hucan beince in nature , by using 
"evolution" to ke 1ntellicence •natural • . 
1. , 322. Note hero tho informal fallacy of appeal to tho 
authority ot "ae1ence" , Furt hermo , unless oul- psycho-
logy ia denied sci entific st~tua. the stAte ont is not 
ev true . 
2 . EN1 3~7 , 343 . The progenitor of Darwinism bolieved im-?11c1tly 1n tl~ consistency of1 evolution 1n accorda e 
lth a Cos·\l1c 'ill by natural selection. 
3 . E :f1 337. 
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llaro ·a rtrat end roromo t • t rtallot. rlr 
tro1n.1n; 1n tb to1~1a1 oi 'OB 1 
t. . cio tir o · thoo. T! rt or :cio!lt! 
o~..ulote • t ocrton, or 1!'y old cnclt S.n tbo 
apnot tttr 
od la to 
cc or 
o· t ct l ov!do:~o . In oi nti ~a ·v 0 • 
ll;;r re!'e.rr-ed to o61 r t n or1r.:t o · • a 1 
a~ tho Od .!cation did not tly violoto t 
P rul.'1ton1. llara turnod to >h .Q#opby, it Jfl8 
w ot 
at 
........ u. l thtlt ho pnl:r tho o1ont1tle thoo ( lob 
1: ccti o 
o thO l"h1'31Cn 1 eeicnt.:s ... 't! l.~nllc .... 
crt !"8 e~).Cb inter ro t!. ~ 1 llo , b t t 
~~ .:.oc:t to oo a.:l ::>":or-arch n ttorn, tllrou. ~ .. o:.1t o lta"s' 
• cb. I' tt r in:. tG ~ p into to· o:::'d .. c..~-
blwloooo or t 
no t eo.aily 
anttt tical t~nd$. r biG .\~ ·1 V loneo le 
la1nod. by ·ho y otuetJ-U tb::t ··· ro r ~ t o 
~or c1 10.t1:l roc:G '~ o.nd ot nnini. .. ll.n..;~ ' t.1loso .. 
h.J• • ::s.rot 1.\C t:JGtGph~t41C4l in tc.vo~ of 
.. ll • ... c oQJ JOn o au o irloal c l>OS l lo, 
ovi t;.() olo o lly. llc.ra' loooplly• 
orl!e out tho e t e1ss1ng t e 
t • 
In t ~"rol~· .. t~"'t..,.out of ~ol'ln.rs• p~!.lt~oopb¥. t t 1() 
5S . 
prlnclpl <J or 
C.otcrmined hie 
ater!Al monism and emp1r1ci m soo~ to have 
1 pistomology , his sol ution ot the mlnd• body 
proble~, his unification or the scianc a , hi e phasia on 
evolution, ~~d h!e d ni 1 or God. 
! . 6fi p: ~0, obove, Sellars s ~a th t his epi te~olo~ ls 
to det rQinG hie metaphysics . ET1dence 1v n in thia 
ch ptor indicates, howover, that the actual occu.wrenco 
is much eloaor to hia taphya1ca havtnz dete~ d hie 
ep1sto ology. Tho possibility of 3uch ha beon noted 
end co nted on in rn . 1. p . 'l.O. 
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IV. SE1.LAR. t USE o:-~ J.:. OIU'l'IO ARY CO CEPTS 
Sellara • trouble is that he tried to be scientific. 
And "empiricism" in science is quite a different thing than 
is 11 piricism" in philosophy --- thtJ diff'or nee 1e both his-
toric 1 and prosently function 1 . 
>hiloaophical em~1r1c1nm connotes a cons1dorat1on of' tho 
cla1 s or all th d1tf'eront oboervable real1t1o , omp oy1ng 
synthetic speculative thought, deductive logic, and tho 
introduction or all kinds or unknowns, unobservablea, or 
unvor1f1ablos (e . n. , 1orld-Ground, atoma , flelds of' ro ce , 
-
neutral ont1 tios , 'etbor •) to insure too coho renee of a l o i -
eal system hieh ill include tho data or experienoo . Sci n-
tif1o e r>1riclom, on tb other hand, connotes a aaic seep-
ticimn about e.ll the different observable roal1t1es, hopin 
and. e:tpoc·tine; to reduoo them to t nimpl~Hlt or tho a1 ready-
established roalitioa , and e ploying an lytic thought, indue-
tivo lo~ic , and--- in ver7 possible instance-- - t Law of 
P r imony. Philosophical empiricis-m, thon, oleo s any 
well-evidenced ne type or re 11tya scientific e p1rie1sm 
cate~oricalll rejects anything poa1tod as a new type or reali ty. 
The twin o 1-·· nd the7 are inextricably lntertwined---
o ro n1n1n'· " rnpirlcal" nd r t 1n1ng "phyaioal realla " 
monistic lly, loads Sollars to the gisantic task of trying, 
t one and th sa t! , to ndmlt all the r\nli t 1os he ob-
a rvos no a oluralit~, and to reduce t m all to a physic 1 
monity. 
5£' • . 
Sellars realizes th t he should not be n roductionist1 , 
explaining tho hl her in terms or the lo or, if ha is to be 
empirical in a pbilosophlcnl sense; but science is analyti-
cal and roductionistic , end science is his model . Accord-
inglyr we obccrvo tho cor~lict, which results in roduction-
lcm at somo ti~c (' hon mind is ~~dorntood as body, thoro 
.., 
io no mind-body probloo' )"" nd ttexpansionism1' t others 
( •~o !'leod to oxpo.nd our concept of .tatter '; 'mat tor is a 
3 
stuff lnch could raiso itself to consciousness•} • 
In both phases or the conflict, in the reducing mood 
o.nd tho accepting mood, tho concept of ovolution in used 
in building t~1e case. 
1. Evolution Usod Empiricistically. 
fotont;1a11.tz . ~ llars uoes tho evolutionary concept to 
credit what ho moans by ttpotont1tl1ty" . By ay of nogat.ivo 
definition, he writes 
alee potonttulity ignores croativa activity and 
holds tho.t th rosult ,a!l already tb.ere in oomo 
sonoo at tt~ bo~:nning. It is an attempt ti be-
little tho s1 n1f!cnnco of t1ma and chanma . 
I •. EN, 15, 164. 
n . -o..:-a> "t!soc. rrom EN, 301 . CF., also, 298, 299 . 
3. Porapl1ro.sod from E q, SlS, 543. CF., also, 20, 316 . It 
might bo poociblo , if ono oro sllrflc1ently alf chobon, 
to consider reduction and expansion as two sides op tho 
aamo coin, tho coin of unifying mind and matter . dow-
over, ! do not believe Sellars does so, by roo.son or his 
vory tenaeious hold on U ttor as thG single reality. 
4. EN, 283. 
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Sellaro fools that, potentially, anything enn happon; that 
"possibility and impossibility aro cato orios or jud ent ••• 
tho natural 1eyulso is to hold that Tlhat has not oecurrod 
cannot occur. 111 Ho vor, ho is not completely indetermin-
istic, as this ~otntion might indicnto . \ ith1~ tho method 
of "@UlOtic contlnui ty" , !lpotont1 lity ••• is an assertion 
of causa l determ1n1om. "2 Unfortunatoly, ttgonotie contin-
uity" seems to moan thnt anythin can hnppon, ~o long an it 
3 4 bar a history. If this io t case, th n this particular 
nrgumant is circular and a ounts to nothing more than an 
un3upportod st tomont that anything is potent ial in this 
"natural" ·orld. As to ap c1f ic potcntio.li tios, ttfOl" mo , 
ttor io activo and capable or high lovols of org nization 
f . E j , 265-2 7. 
2 . EU., 2J5. 
5. "History", or llars, includoo tho prob bility that 
tho laws or activity, of £unction, (tho causal lawo), 
may cha~ ~•r-ng tho building up of t'o wYDtGm of nature . 
Soo pn 67 bolo • It oeems u minute point of diffor-
<. -ce t o l .. ':.. t th t o u t not · surpri ed (see pago 
~l hen a novel objoct is croetod from a fam111 r object 
.• lo ono is ;a~cblng it; but that ono mus t oonfosa to 
hallucinations hen a novel ob ject appears horo thoro as 
no objoct bGfore . In £ ct , it Deems li r.u1bbl1n • 
4 . Sellars de f ines r.c usnl continuity ••• th t tho f inal re-
sult of an nctuel process is the natural and loR1t1mate 
expres sion of the changing cy tom. " ( , 283) " Poten-
t! lity ••• is but a shorthAnd xproasion for tb netic 
continuity or a past process, an aosortion of cauoal 
eotoz~inis~ . Only in so far s it tends to 1gnoro the 
1m~ortanco or tha cctual conditions and t o intermediate 
steps is it fc11oc1ous . ' (E l , 265 ) '' lo it sooms to 
that the cstogorr ot potonti lity ••• is a reco ition thot 
hat comes to pass is a function of actual tnetoro but 
that ench f ctor l as its own nnturo . It is to comb! a -
tion ·hich accounts for any actual process . Thus e per-
son-.a in his youth pot nti~lly m ny th1 o . " (E1, 285) 
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and aooumulotlon . u1, and "the un1verse ••• 1 ado of stutt 
which had th potential po r to raise itoelf to self-con-
sciousness in him tJ an]. n2, 
If th& preeed1n" para r ph hAs not dono justic to 
" 
n tic continuity"; then it 1 ell to give more ntt n-
tion, now, to this blind •etter whoso potentiality is self-
consc1ousnosa . Perhaps tho phraoe 1o adoqu toly explain d 
if it is surmi od that tho perm nonce or the aturr furnis a 
tho 0 continui ty" and tbe " n tic" aspect refers to the ten-
doncy of Mattor inhorontly to be ct1ve Rnd, boi etivo , 
to •fall into• now patterns. Tho most important aspect or 
genotic continuit7 is the insistence that th re is basic, 
ehnn elosa stuff out or which n w activities omorse bee use 
the tuft ralls ho1r ton patterns of organ1zatio~ .3 
Dovelo2 nt ot relations as functioning entities . The 
patterns or organization or, i . e . , the rel tiona between, 
-
"ato ic"4 particlea of matter aro hol d, by s llars, to be 
5 functioning entities , whose existence , effectiveness, and 
creativity are justified throu h evolutionary, genetic 
1 . Bil, 3fS. 2. EU, 343 . 3 . E i , 343, 21;3 . 
4 . Atomic 1n th original sonne . Thus , i n 3ohr's theory, 
tho "uncut tables" are electrons , proton , etc . , which---
hon orgnn1zod in di~forent patterns---~unotion d1ffer-
1ngly as tho o- oalled atoms ot hydro en, helium, carbon, 
ox7gon, end t ro3t . Sellars spc ks, in terms or o r•a 
to theory, or "spatially or anizod electrical ohnr e " • 
(l::n, 179) 
s . ~oo pp . G~, G3, 73 ~8 '4 below. Sollars does not , like 
Plato, ascribe en existence to form, se ar te from tter. 
"1 . 
1 
continuity or tho active , sclf-oxciting Jc.ttcr . Sollars 
sooms to £eel thut all ystery hns bean removed from tho 
process of o 1•geoco if ono can only chow that somo original 
building-blocks aro ctill present in a complex, now structt~e . 
!f th1s prosupponition ro corroct , t;hon Sellar& ' csreful 
syatematizat:on of tho lovolo o£ realt~, baood on chango-
loss minionl- particlos or tter, ould bo lo lcnlly con-
vincing nnd co elusive ar uoent . · ooover, so long as th<' 
premise can be chollon ed, thoro 1c room for doubt . If, for 
tlc moment , 1t is aoeumod that relatione nro functioning 
2 
entitles ; thon to be ablo to show how those rolatio~s m1 t 
"omorge" .from 1nlnal-part1cles of matter ls oufficlont t o 
bri n joy to the heart or any goe>d atorial-mon!st . <avon 
~ctivity in the m1nimul-part1cloo of mattor, tho argumont 
for chance organization---of particles into atoms, atoms 
into oloculos, mol ecules into cells, iL.""Jd colla into organ-
isms---nlthough it 1~ not conclusive cannot bo disproven, 
either, nnd is , a.ccordinzly, a. livo pooo .... bility and a 
1 . see , esp cinlly, EN, S29 . 'Is tho organism a moro aggre-
gate or parts (Ul tho elomontal ist assumos? Or is it 
un1 ty in ~hich tho p rts ple..y into one no thor ond tho 
ole into tho partoT I am persuaded that tho lattor is 
tho caeo. Th o-:rgnni::~m ic not e. moro aggrega te . It is 
an organization in \Vbich there 1o a difforontintion of 
!'unction. n 
2 . A very strong cane can be made for this idea: Bohr's 
Eloctron 'I'heory of tb9 Atom, c o genorally accepted, 
aseumos lt; all modorn thoorios of chomicul compounds 
nasumo it, if they do not prove it; Aristo~l~ 's d.ocuo-
oion of cause finds it e nacossary idoa; and no house-
build r ould evor a oo t nt the relations of tho parts 
are unimportant . 
~2 . 
tenable posi t ion . 1 It is indubitable that , on the matorinl 
lovol3 r.10:otioned, organ1zo.t1on c ontrols new a ctivitien, if 
2 it doos not crouto t bom and perform them. Tho importance 
~:: or anization ccnnot oo quootioned; although its naturo 
3 
ar.d or•lgin can. 
It is fot.• the esta.blishl:ncnt of this nature And origin 
that Sollars turns to evolution. Tho cllmato WLthin which 
evolution can bo orfoctivo is, onco again, tho solf-nctiva 
''stuf't"4 • Sellars poses tl"...c problem, writinG 
By making rorm an objectively sir~lficnnt charac-
ter of' matter we have modified blind necosaity s.nd 
inoculated it Tilth mind. Integration is a vcriablo 
in nature but an effective variable; and , as '::& hnvo 
frequently pointed out , intelligonce51s a function of tho highost levol or integration. 
The mothod of inoculAtion is throu~h tho chance novel organ-
ization or ro ~organization to bo oxpectod from an active 
Matter. This natural evolution can be oatablished if a 
1 .. so11arn prorrupposes that orgnn..tzations of matter, involv-
ing qua.YJtitr..t .• vo <!ifforoncon (G.s th.oy unquo!Jt1onably do) , 
nro nothing but quantitative differences . Tho fallacy 
of "notS:ing-bu€" t h i nking -B o 11 l:.nov-rn . 
2 . Ro~ever, ~ PlAto ~ for oxample , ould find ~tter to be 
intrins~cally ina~ti.v€', the more object upon which actions 
aro perpetrated by non· matorial 1~1doaa" or pattorns of 
orge.nizat1on, t hemsel\"OC ~ctlve .. Tl'l!.s would auggest that 
if organization can contro~ the functioning of matter, 
then :r.d;t::.or !.s not tho ~e-f- ependent , the ultimate , f or 
Which tho physical monist seets . 
3 . in a~pGcial diffi<.ulty sr:see hen Se llar~ considers 
social organiz11tion, "a ne'! motbod of organization": ho 
morol:r calls lt udepnndent' on :Jpatial organization, not 
phyoical or spatiel in its nature . (E!f, 165} '.Pha mode 
of or~nn1zat1on present in syoto~s or idoas io not dcs-
eribed or montionod by Sellars . 
4 . , 3436 263, 319. 
5 . E1T1 ~~39 . 
'33 . 
causal series can bo she~~. 
Doos continuity ••• imply th t the ruturo i~ livo the 
past and that chan o cen only bo repetitions? Suroly 
not . • •• I conclude th t continuity can deunnd 
only iotic relationship, the absence of causal 
breaks . 
Sollnra uill try to d<HJcr1bo tho nature of thlc pro es!livo 
org nlzine, thin genetic continuity . 
That hurmn bo"~-1 vi or and tructuro iro I£ :cl no in 
tho world, cannot, ouroly, be doabtc2 ~y~t~o ovo-
l ut'!.onint . ,hat is postulated s th t thGse 
cnpacitioo and activities and organizntions can 
Xl ohOr::Ji to hnvc ro\'1%1 s l.ep by 3top from receding 
ata.geo . " 
It is for tho nc1ent1ot to toll un of tho nature 
of l"'<Hll connections; and ho • ~ hoglnnln to assert 
tho.t tUB.ny of thono involve t:~ c neo of' thn tor 
n ~'-~o'!T provioU"'ly ox1 tod. C:: ·V;•.t ::1Rt) f Or) -
2It-,O] Tbis :l!l tho ao- cnllt.. t croative'"syntfiosis 
up8~ \' lch tho evolution ry uatarnlist ~tild eo 
lnrgul~ as against tho Elont!c atomi~t .' 
Pl1ysical connections div!do into two cain roups, 
the at1Ql ond tho temporal. On the one hnnd , 
t' o :Jcientlat seeks to comprohend tho structure of 
[his ~ pocinl fiold] ••• on the ot or hnnd, ho tries 
to ~oo one change pas into tho no:tt in a c •t-,ul tive 
cay ~nt 1 tho r nnl otacos of t o historical ~ror.th 
nro ~rasped in the 1 h or tho continuous stops 
hich procoded. To drive the~o tno diwensions of 
oxistonce abre st in kno ·led is t ideal or t 
1 . ·l , 2e4 . A aln , cor-_,par1oon must bo ma.do betwoon Sel nrs ' 
concept of ceu~o end Aristotle's . In spite of Humo , f or 
Selle:-s ca.unc Io or,ta.'liDhed nnd explanation co11plotod 
when a no~ucnco G doscribo • ..o ever, "tho nbsnnco or 
cnuoal brenks" is bnrdly oot bliG 10d to tho ae.tis ction 
or t~~ usual scionti~t or philoeop or of today by a~nglo 
oequonco t et ay not bo r pontod; o.n rnutntiona aro undor 
:no obligc.tion to ropetition. rtha!'moro , orioa of 
oceurroncos hlch han boon repoatodly observed in tho 
past , and 1ihich ouddonl y bringn forth a totally unoxpec-
tod step in tho aorioa, uld not normally be described 
ns havinG': an '' bsonco of c us lro s 1'. 
2 . EU, 284 . Is the accumul tion of myriad tiny noveltie s 
loss or more ystcrious than ono 1 rgo nove lty? 
3 . m , 214- 215. 
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:nodorn sc1tcntiat ui th hio evolutionary way of approach . 
The result of evolution is o etimos to create a now order 
of oxlstonts out of tho old . 
Biology is aa much n phyDic 1 science as is 
phyelcs . It studios tho otructw'o a d behavior 
or org nle bodies hicb are evolved bodies with 
specific properties not found at the !nor anio 
l ovol . • • • lt is not, ns some have supposed, 
thnt ~:e aro ot ble to break dorm tho orsmnism 
into 1 to phynicc.l c.nd chomical parts but that 
holes b vo e propo:;ti s o.s roal ne the pro-
pcrt1os of tle p rts . u 
In the end, Sell rs talms n position that no ateo and makoe 
no ntte pt to explain t or1 in or the no proporties and 
lo. ""' .:n t: o h or lovelc . 
I ~eliovs thnc conscioue esc is an 1rrunt1on so 
f"r as itc novelty is COilcornod, ut not as re -
gards its genetic matrix ond conditions. c Who 
denies tblo ssortlon ot os~ontial co t! uity muct 
aintnin t1 t only conociousnose c n roduco con-
sclousn~cc . 
Imoortcncc or or~~niz tion . 'mile Sellars• rceo~nitlon or 
the loportoncc of or nnizntion has boen commended in the 
previous section; tho n turo and oxtont of tha~ importnnce , 
and the place or tho evolutionary idea in o tabllshing it 
need further examination. 
1 . E , 201- 202. 
2. ,, 191. Sollars fails to distinguish bo l; oen t'w "now" 
proport!Gs of a ehom1cal compound, no compared with those 
of ita chemic 1 elements , n th "new" proportio9 of a 
living cell, ac comp rod 1th tboso or tho chemical com-
pounds th t compose lt . Th e mounts to n~ actin- (or 
rojectin~) tho distinction bet oon dltforoncos or dogroe 
and of kind, a.nd ic not a oqua~e a~ an o :p nnation of tho 
orl ·in of obnervod d1ff roncea of kind . 
-
3 . E l , ::!85 • 
G5. 
1l'ho extent and p~lrpo::;o Of Sollars' t:.Se Of the idea Of 
effective structures aro epl.tomizod ln tho followinn o:xeerpt. : 
Our conclusion is tr~t organization is objectively 
significant and eaucally otfoctivo . ~~nction and 
structuro go toBother at C7ory levr1 . Func .lo'1 is 
but the active phesc of structure . In no othor 
~ny can ~e int~rprot cvolutlon a~d brine mlnd end 
body togo t'· or. 
One of Sellars ' purposos in claiming tr~ 1mnortanco of form 
io ce rtainly to ellow all possible oxporlonces of reality ; 
and by holdin all activities to bo opiphenornono of opatial 
structures , he ic ablo to explain tbom a ay as quantit tlvo 
t) 
dlfforancos, denying thn · toy differ ln kind . ~ 
~ vol·.J~ ion plays a supportinr· role to tho idoa of tho 
lm~ortuz~e or orgoni~a~ion: it furnishes e juat~flcntion, by 
tho concept of "gcnotlc continuity", o!' tho or1r;ln, tho 
affoctiveoo,.F , nnd the con~1n n g erection of nc po.t;terns 
of organization with ne~ functlons . 3 Evolution also allows 
3cllo.l .. S to 1'ind consc:ou.s i-cd ao an oplphcnomonon of tho 
opatinl conf:gur'tiono of .at tcr: 
I shall ar~~e in tho next c!~ptor thnt consciousnosD 
i:J not, a no•• stuff in any metaphy-lc..ll ::~anse and that 
awaronoos and co~1itlon are f unc' ions of tho struc4uro 
or consciouanoss and tho activity of the organi sm. 
u • 334 . cr.t el5o , 190- 191. 
2 . E. ~ . ; 11Ccnoc ou:.noos is a functional expression of tho 
brn!n and so in"" ·nal to, r.nd continuous ·i tL., ;>bysi<.".a l 
!"'oality. " (EN, 50 ) Ills a chemlea.l compound a more agr~re ­
r ato '! Is tho1·e not- n 1ntim!l to synthesis involved? If 
so, the difforonco bctv.eon the organism and the olemontary 
chec1cal compound is ono of degree and not of kind. u 
(EN, 329) Cf ., also , 53~, 190-191, 313 . 
~. BN, J65, 32~ 
4 . EN, 283- 284 . 
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Tho psyobieal is a natural ingredient or tho bratn at 
those levels and its function is to id in tho solu-
tion of problems by tho euos it affords . Conscious-
ness liter lly assists tbo brain to moat no situa-
tions . tio must gx-ae. th1a presence of' conaciouanese 
in a non-dualistic ay . • •1 ~:e must nlargo our conception or tho physical. 
ental ab111t1os are the results of biological muta• 
tion and are the wltnesses to types or causal action 
1n the brain, not round elsewhere at lower levels . 
Tbore 1a a ode of action or tho brain corrospond1ftg 
to reasoning, to mory, to purpose, to foresight . 
Tho tull extent to which sellara combines evolution and 
organization is not realized, however, until he suggests: 
Hay not organizo.tion bo the idontity whose ditter• 
cnees epo 11 evolution! All through tb& argument ot 
this book, we have proclaimed the ro 11ty or 1"orm. 
Evory particular substance is an organized stutr. 
h~olution means that there are le•ola 1n nature, 
that the h1gbor 1s an outgrowth of the lower, that3 A and B into grated are more than A nd B so para te. 
In one ot tho clasa1e stories ot 
the sc1onco- t1ot1on t1eld, eallod "The Fa1rr Ches!ml$n"4, tho 
~&tery ot tho episode 1e finally solvod whon the hero die-
covers that the syatom or laws govern1nn nature is being 
changed, suddenly flnd radically, .from t 1mo to timo . The 
1. Elf, !1!. seo also, · , 333t .. That instinct is tho ex• 
pression ot organization 1a the conviction of both b1olo• 
g1ata and psycbolog1ats . u 
2. EN, 313. Sellars gives no hint ot tho naturo of this new 
mode or actiona a bare existential statoment, without 
evidence to warr nt ita belief and disdaining to charac-
terize that which ls d&elarod to exist, carries no argu-
mentative force. 
3. EN, 329. 
4. Reprinted 1n KUttnor, TFC. 
6'7 . 
author asa s th1a ould bo a tag er1n concept for the 
re der to gr asp; vef!'1 prob bly ho ia right . ut this con-
c pt is just t on Sollars e bodies when he writes of a 
changing system • 1 
Context 
Tho Eleatice opposed ••• the follo rera of Horacl1 tus 
••• The increasing recor,nit1on o evolution for 
every lev 1 rL nature shows , howovor, tbat there is 
no logical conf 1ct horo . ' s lon as thoro is e. 
lar moao~o of stability in structure and behavior, 
our knowledco will tnko the f6rm of laws . on to 
tho evolutionist natura is not a flux . 
The problem beforo ac1onco and philosophy in these 
days is to harmonize no~ forms of organization, new 
types or behavior, now proportios with tho oro 2 stable and fixed background of inorganic nature . 
kes the quotation clear in ay1ns that laws chan 
by replacement , not just by addition, and that chan s are s o 
slow during the evolutionary n tural1st's short lifetime , 
that real novelty is lost in tho shufflo between poor f ormu-
lation of past ob orvations of tho s occurrences and lack 
of any for~ulation bocauoo as novoltios thooo h ve nevor 
occurr d beforo . By positing a chang1n sy tom or natur a l 
la s , Sollar cnn glvo soao account of the appoarQnce or new 
typos of roality. And evolution of the "higher" levels trom 
t lower soems to provide a vory credible oxplan t1on ot the 
occasion for changing laws . However, aside from tho analo y of 
"new" prop rtios in a che~ical compound, Sellars has not iven 
any roal argucont to justify tbo bel1of that ovolut1on is in any 
l . J..; . a:o., !.ill, 283. cr., also , EU, 316, 335, :529, 284 , 212, 
nnr; ~10, 263, 165. 
2 . E., 283. 
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sen3o ~f!! in sy8tc:nic chan~es o.f the univorso * if such 
have to.kon place . And no po.rticula.:- e•Jido:1ce is adduced to 
shm.! thut m!.nd ha:J ovolved, causo.lly, f.!.' om o.ttt.::-, othor 
than their historical soauonco ac it can be read trom tho 
matot•ial record . I!' tho h iddon pra..niso--- tho.t all reall ty 
is material---is usod, very good argument :or tho creation 
or mind fro~ mattor by evolution can bo formulated . But if 
this argument is U$od, in turn , to provo tho materia l nature 
of a l l roal ity; the eetit19 princiEii in im~d1ately n~par­
ont . 
The oxtont to which Ssllar:J carries the notion of 
changi ng systems or l awc is ,. porhnps , most clearl y stated 
v1hon ho wrltoa of dlffor~nt kinds of organizations , attemp t -
ing to link thom t ogether i nto an ovolut!onary, oonletic 
chain. 
Human boingn ont-er into what •;ro call social rela-
tions .. ., o. no~; t"l.ethod of orA;enization •• • Tho re l a -
tion botv1oon ci t ! zan and 'soc'Ia"ty !s physically 
eo~dit!onod, but i s no l ther a chomical nor a 
blolo ~lc 1 t¥Pc of rolntion. In other words , re -
lations a ro rofei ent to and expressive of tho 
charactar or tho termo . Jt is the rocognit!on 
that both terms and re l ations chnnra with ovol~tion 
that disti nguishes modornlovo!ut!onn17 natural !sm 
from the mechanica l type . 
1 .. £·!, '135. The latter two U11dor11ninr;s aro lllino . lloto , 
first , tho lang:mgc ro~orring to difi'c r oncos or i~ind ; 
and thc.t SOllars elsov!horo aili:nitc only to d il"1'erences 
of dogreo . Tho last sentoneo ie intercst!ng in show1no-
how clearl y Sol lars rcnliccs bo has tr.kon an unorthodox 
vlow of ''cau~o t« , and/ or b O.'f far ho hao dopo.rtod fro!Il tho 
usual belief 1n tho 1mmtoh11! ty of mechanism in tho 
physical ronL.'l'l . 
69 . 
1 rr any further docQ~entation is noedod to clarify Sollarc ' 
contention of tho variability of natural law, tho following 
should. aupply it : 
I boliovo that consciousness is nn irruption so far 
as its novelty is concornod, but not 09 regards Its 
gono tic tnatr:tx and cond1 tiona .. He who donie s this 
assortion of ccsential continuity mus~ ~aintain 2 thnt only coneciouanosn can produce consc1ousnosa . 
O~toroncsia allc'l ;enyloe;enesls. 'rho doctrine of Rocnpitu ... 
1 3 . . at ion is mantionod : but soiTcchow Se 11ars seems not to trust 
this facet or evolutionary thought , perhaps beoe.uae 1 t m1 ht 
introduce purposo into tho development of the phylum and 
thanco into the universo as a holo. 1 
ny moans or llgenet:ic continuity-.,, 
identity remainln3 through ovolutlonnry chant:!ea , Sellars is 
able to posit his apiotooologiccl renllsm---to justify his 
*animal faith •---on the bLlsis t:1a.t evan thourh conoc1ousnons 
ic commonly called non-matorial, it ie a function derivative 
c 
from mo.terial, spatial structure0; e.nd conscious knowlOdfi;o 
munt thoroforA . being itself p1ysical ln naturo6 , hnvo true 
! . Cf. , u!no, EN, 74, 263, 281- 284, 316 , 329 , 335 . 
2 . !m, 285 . SOe also E :, 318: 11Consc1ousnosa . • . is a qua.lity 
of a novel "l.olo, and in as novel ao tho synthetic wholo 
or ~mich it is ~n exprooslon . I have frocuontly callod 
it a variant to bring out its ox1stential correlation 
with a corop lox procoss. " 
3 . r-; It 167 , 339. 
~ . TI111 is described in onG plnea (~! , 276) as merely tho 
eb111ty to achieve the onds dictetod by instinct and 
cxperionco. Sollars avoid~ purpose like tho p lague . 
5 . E :l, 313 . 
6 .. E r, 58, 313. 
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roprosontation of any phy31cal world.1 It 1e v1ith groat 
roluctn.ncG , and with tho it>JmOdio.to rosorvation that !alnd was 
oriGinally a function for adaptation only, that Sollars nd-
m1ts mind might co::no to nook kno·vlodgo for tho snko of know-
2 ing. 
B'ov! natural thoso distinctions built around ''th1n~s 11 
cour . J Ho\'1 inevitable they scom to us to bel And 
;;et they nrc gl'"'Otlth.s 'Whoso poychological bnsis nnd 
stage~ ~e cun in a mcasu!~ traco. ~hey aro oxprcs-
sion3 o.f tt:..c 1ntorprotut!.vo dr5.ft of consciousnocs 
ur.~cr ... he play of organic inatincts and oxternn.l 
sti!:!uli.~ 
tvoidln.n: pt!rpose . 1o mentioned earlier4, Sollars seoms 
dotcr!'!'l.inod to havo n metsphysioal systom in whioh Matter is 
the basis and source of nll; and ho scoma convinced that tho 
admission or purposo within the system would forco a self-
5 
contrndietion ·1~on rnatorlal1sm. Tho evolutionary ccncopt 
13 u~ad in the struggle to avoid purpose . 
1 . 11 \'o aro on tho insido of tho brain and at its focal level 
of oporctlon. Hore objective f.lnd oubjectivo activity 
moot . " (EN, 31~) Soe also EN, 316 , on "perception no tl 
neurally modinted e.ct1vity11 • 
2 . :EN, 7·1. 27(). ~ l::;o, 11Th~ ro.in is ••• ccntrollcd by the 
neuronic syotent whle.h is functionally uppermout . n (316) 
5 . Ell , 69. !ioto the cmvt:onnl connotations of tho last 
oentence . "Drift" indica. tea tho. t tho consciol.t~ faculty 
haS no GOlf,...c ontrOl . r:Untlol~ th.Q play Of 11 indicates fur-
ther nubjugaticn, suggost1ng that conseiousnoss 1a tlro 
toy of mattor , ttith oven less status tb.a:t a pawn of csueal 
detormin:h;m. The hlindnoss of ttorga.nic instincts" would 
gonorelly be concedod: consclousness is ~ot orton held to 
bo neccssc.z·y for tholr fu:."'lctioninr; . ~o tho implication, 
that if mind can bG controlled by blind instinct and 
oxtornal stimuli it 1s not as orthy or adoration as 
.!att<,.r, ~ vo~"'Y rcs.lily concluded. 
4 . See page 20, above . 
5 . !...:I, 164, 2'"/0, 239. 
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~i1l"Ough tho uno or Da~w1n 1 s hypotheeea of nal.uro.l Vf!rie.-
tion and of gonotic chango throueh netural selection, Sellars 
carvos cut a ~tand that consciousness is tho natural child of 
mnttor and iYJ:.?tinct., Sil'lco a genotlc COllt!.nulty is exhibited 
1 
among the threo. uaonotic continuity" .further permits con-
sciousness., onco its historical functionality for matter is 
notod2, to hog1n to function on n now lovel --- viz . , men-
-
telity for ita own suke, or curloslty. 3 Sellars' rejection 
of purpose is clear: 
Evolution io but anothor term for chan&o or the 
variable character of spocl1'1c things . Wo -oust rid 
tho tarm of e.n7 fin~lism and be ready to admit thnt 
any clumr;c is t;ho function or conditions . But it 
~oenm clear empirically that conditions on tb1s 
planet have temporarily, ut leastJ bean fnvornblo 
to a precess of cumulativo change leading fr~m 
u.~its of lover to units of a higbar order. 
Hm.ovor, re jeet purpose (Hl ho would; Sellars is unabl.G 
to oscapo such instances of implied purpoac as "adaptation" !J 
''control or • • • tho univorso in which it finds itself" , and 
I. !.if, 313.. \"thy "the solution ot' probloms•t is not a purpos-
ive activ.!~y, I cannot see . Perhaps it is boeauso the 
p:r•ol>lems ere originally concerned with the moving of 
matter; s.n.cl tho <.HlUCH111 ty of mat tor is cortmonly beliovod 
to operate without purpose . It may bo Sollars 1~ once 
again tnl::ing e.dvantn.p;o of tho U.."lspccified con."1ot tions 
of con1~n w~rds and idoau. 
2 . .... ? ' 340. 
3 . EN , 7 4, 27 6 • 
-<1. .. ·:rr, DGl. Du;yoUr (!:!D, 30-39) has cnlculatod thn proba-
bility oi' the exiotcnco of thl~ fuvornblG plnnot and 
auspicious chnn~es that l avo apparently occUl .. rod 'i¥'ith1n 
it; it iro is nnywhoro near correct, it ic Qbnurd to be-
lieve that higher mo tf phyoicul Ol .. dors evolved t1:-.rom lower 
orrlcrs 1lthcut purpoco . 
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solf-orgnn1zat1on.1 It should be poss1blo to find at leaot 
an intrinsic purpose in tho activity that brin s organization 
and change . 
Experimental phys1c3, ehemiatry, biology and psych-
ology, all aro floodod ith tho approeiation or 
tona1on , adjust ont, equilibrium, growth, 1nterde- · 
pondonco . 10 do not 11torally 1ntu1t aeti•1tr in 
nature but ~ intolloetually graap it ns that which 
alone comprehends organi~ation and ehnngo. Reality 
is activo 1n tho aenoo that things pt done , ~hat 
unions aro formed , that now properties arise. 
ftvo1d1n~ explanation. It appears characteristic of tbo 
naturalistic position that it retusos to give explanationo 
ot its motaphyoieal system. Ho ovor, in view of Aristotle ' s 
definitions o~ eauoo3 , and in v1o of naturalistic rejection 
of ultimate purpose 1n tho universo, no explanation in terms 
ot purpose ma~ lor ically be expected. The question to be 
investigated in this section concorns Sellars ' uso of ovolu-
~ in nvoiding explanations . 
Dopondin~ on teoporal soquonco , upon which Humo cast so 
much doubt , to fulfill tho philosophical noed of oxplana-
t1on4, Sollars calls upon "genetic cont1nu1 ty" as the final 
5 
ans\vor . And that concopt is an &xpans1on or the ideas ot 
1. ~N, sg, 52, 234. 162. Seo En, 164, on the an1ng of 
1ndividua11tJ. 
2. EN1 234. 
5 . sec alao nowne on tho noeoes1ty of w1ll for continuity ot 
tho : orld-Ground, i . e ., for tho eon€!nu1ng action o£ 
•na tural l a '. -
4. "jc explain ovonte by finding their anteeodonts . " (EN, 198) 
Soo, also, Qu, 239. 
5 . E i , 284 , 239, 232, 278, 164· 165, 34~. "lTatUN governs 
1tselt according to its nature . " (EN, 164) 
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n tural variation and natural selection. "Description" and 
"explanation" soem to be synonyms in the naturalistic meta-
l physics . 
han Sellars writes " ~o explain ovents by finding their 
antocedenta . "2, he does not answer tho question of the in-
finite rogross of causes . ~his failure may be universalized 
to tho stntemont that Sellars does not answer tho question 
of first couse --- he rnanorally ignores it, nd occasionally 
tries to explain it away. 
Authoritarianism. Evolution becomes a method whereby 
Sellars can have his cake or philosophy and swallow the 
science of hia day, too. 3 Evolution can link all the levels 
ot reality, with their autonomous sciences4, together . 5 
Throu~h gonetic conti nuity, baste physics can eventually 
tathor, by "creative synthes1s"6, the study of logic and 
7 
ethics . He is particularly impressed by behavioristic 
psyeholo~y as the one true doctrine and as cap ble of 
bein~ linked continuously 1th biology.S Sociology 
1. EN, 232 . 
2 . EN, 198. 
3 . EN, 263. "Tho older naturalism • •• did not appreciate bio-
logy and psychology. It was a product of physics and 
chemistry alone . JJUch of tho fear of naturalis , or its 
fataliBD and bleakness, was due to this pr1mo disre nrd 
of huaan charactor1st1cs . In a ord, it was unempirical. 
Tho evolutionary naturalist trios to understand the actual 
world in all its complexity and differentiation. a (E~, 
104-1 5) 
4. I:N, 19, 296 . 
5 . EN, 263, 261. 
6 . EN, viii . 7 . t, 276 , 284 . S . t. , 287, 299, 296 . 
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is montionod as a science capable of integration with tho 
1 
rost . 
Evolutionary naturalism 1a tho eonteoporary or 
pragmatism, genotie psychology, behaviorism, elec -
tronic physics, social ethics and op~stemolo~1cal 
realism. I pray that this be noted. 
2. Evolution Used neductioniatlcally. 
In the grand process of reducing roality to atter, 
Sellars uaos ovolut1on every step or the way. The following 
paeao 1ntond, accordingly, to use a logical exposition of 
his chain or ar nt as a fr movork for displaying hie use 
ot ovolution. 
atter is active. Sellars would probably not care bothor 
matter bo active or not, except as he could see an opportu-
nity to use tho attr1buto in reducing other reality to matter. 
He does find a un1quo mode or reduction involving evolution, 
and roqu1r1ng the activity or atter. Matter 's activity pro-
vides the basis ot the changes that are evolution3; Sellars 
see a to h vo the ideo. that chan es along accusto d lines 
t111 reassure readers that there is nothing ystorious About 
chan a that are unusual. Also, "act1v1ty" carr1oa with 1t 
some connot tion or "ability to rorco cha~", ouch as 
t. £11, 263, 287. 
2. ER, v111 . 
s. ,, 153. 
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Sellars seems to have in mind when he writes , " uni•erse 
••• is made of sturr which had the potent! 1 po er to rai se 
1tselt to selr- consc1ousness . "1 and "For me , matter 1 active 
and capable of high levol of organization 2 nd acc,lmulation. " 
Since Matter is capable or. self- aetivstod evolutlon, the clear 
1m)lieat1on ot tho latter uotation, it becomes easy to r -
duee even eonaciousnosa3 to mattor . 
I seem to find this deoper principle in tho beliof 
thnt chanro oxpro sea tho nature or t hat hlcb 
c~nre , that a chan e 1a not ad~ nt1t1ous and, aa 
it re , tac d on tr outside , but something 
1eh r.iwa out ot the very heart or that which 
changes . 
Time and seace . en Sell•rs defi nes "real time" as "chanse" , 
it is soon round that he do a not an chan e accordin t o 
established un1for 1t1ea but evolutionary chan e, the un-
5 predictable rise or ne fo s and functions . In usin 
e•olut1on to reduce mind to brain, Sellars writes , "Time aa 
a rowth rather than time as a re lapse ••• 1 the impor tant 
interpretation of tho brain- 1nd. "6 The theories of evolu-
tion by selec tion and by mutation ere ovident when Sellars 
mont ions 
l . ~N, 543. 
2 . 315. 
3 . 58. 
4 . 248 . 
5 . Seo quotation next abovo . leo, EN, 283 : "ralso poten-
t! 11ty i'-~oree creative activity and holds that the 
~oault was already there in eo e senae at the bor1nn1n~. 
It is an attompt to bolittl the o1gn1f1canee dt ti 
nd chan • " 
• E!f, 171. 
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d1fferont ratos of chango, ••• naturo often works 
liko a ~asoline angina by a sor1oa of quiok explo-
sion:h At other t1~s~ chango seems to be progroa .. 
o1ve and continuous. 
Drastic doparturoa trom tho com:ton eoncoptiono or T1mo and 
Spaco arc noed.od for tho service ot evolution in redue t1on; 
require development and doeponing: they aro apt to 
bo conceived 1n too passive end mathematical a form. 
While space blossoms out, ~ith the increase of know-
lod~c, into tho categories or dynaoie relation and 
internal orgnn1~at1on, ttmo deepens into tho ideo 
of proeossos o~ euculat1ve chango. Dynamic elements 
enter t§ g1vo body and energy to our concept of 
naturo. 
Self-or~anlzine;. Ono or the most 1nteroct1ng aspeets of 
the activity or tatter is Sellars' contention that 1t is 
solf-orgnniz1ng. 3 Exactly whother everything !s mattor 
beeauee matter 1s self-organizing, or matter ia solr-organ-
izing boeause everything is matter, Sollars does not makn 
eloar. At any rate1 tbo self-organization or matter is ox-
poetod by Sellars to explain the appearance o~ the uhigher 
4 levols" within tho "lovl·or" . ow modos or organ1zat1on 
5 bring, of course, new functions. Thora is an occasional 
h1nt6 that creative s~thoaes are responsos to exto1~l con-
d1t1ono; but generally th~y a:ro depicted without ovon this 
1 • ... ·t, !1'§-120. Sollars dooa not nnswor tho questions or 
durntion that aro rn1sod b7 Bowno, Bergoon, Aloxandor, 
and h1tch.ond. 
2 . :£:.'11, 1~2-123 . 
3. Bt:, 162, 264- 265. 
4. EU, 316, 58, 2G2, 335. 
5. EN, 25~-265, 234. 
5 . EN, 179, 52, 197, 237. 
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~lomont ot dotormin1oc. Such teleology ~ould soon introduce 
purpoce into l1o.turo, if it wore allowed to play a significant 
pnrt in the syatom; and it haa boon nctod that sellers has n 
vestod interest in that process. The idea is, then. to bo 
placed under atr1ct limitations . 
Does tho ereati;o;o purposiveness o~ tho brain in 
ontogenotlo adjustments throw any light upon 
phylogenesis? I would not bol1ttle tho anal~gy 
ae l ong as tho d11"fereneos are kept in mind. 
E;piphonomna. ~t' .. f.!h;Z~!e~~ re~l1tt: Although ha oecas1onally 
eontradictn bimseU2 , Sollars consistently talros the position 
tbat orgontzations, and tho functions that omorge rram and 
with them.} o..ro mere epiphonomona., superimposed on the basic , 
ehtmgoloss stu:rr and 1ncs.:pe.blo or a.ffect1ng it (although 
they can operate on their own and hi~hor lovols4 ). 5 Deter-
minism of tho 'h1~Jhor ' by tho •lower •6 is earr" ... od to the 
extreme by Sell ars: "To be determined by one •s own nature 1s 
7 
to be free .a Justification or the determinism 1s achieved 
through ovol ut1on: :Jinco all other ordora aroae by evolution 
from matter and nre dependont upon matter~ tho causal mocha-
a 
n1em wh1cb 1s indisputably o~ident rrom our ntudy of matter 
1. '::!T, !JSB. cr., also. 125 ~ 316. 
2. EN. 232~ 2~ 329. 
s. cr •. , Elh 334- 335, 339. 
4. En; 329, 295 , 315, 185. 
5. EN, 335, 329, 313, 307, 316, 353, 278, 276, 2&3, 3151 261. 
6 . cr., E'l , 2111 . 
7. E:ti , 2'1a. see also Ell, 74 , 23:7, 30'7 , 316 , 339, on the 
determination of mind by mattor. 
e. Forse t il\WO 1 
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muot , therefore , apply to tho pipbeno na of matter. Al -
thou b this conclusion 1a lor1cally at1on ble1, llar 
insists that ~the increasing recognition of evolution f or 
every 1 vel ot nature shows, ho ver, that tbare is no 
logical conflict hore . ~2 
IJakos "history;" important. If evolution io used to a -
tablish social organization as an opip no non of ttor, 
thon the miraculous series of changes roaulting in this· 
eatabl1shoont boco os quito important3 , and w1 lds an impor-
tant 1nfluonco on tho concept of "Time" as change , that 
Sellars builds . 4 
A physical thing is tho product of it hiotory. 
Tho orsanism ia a atrikin~ case or thls cumulative 
intoer tion !n hicb tho past lives on into tho 
1: 1f evo!ut1on 1a t ken seriously, so that e beliov in 
the emergence fro tho familiar of eomethin novel (un• 
predictabl e and provioual7 non- existent) . then there is 
no lo~1eal necessity that tho o ergent have any part1cu-
lnr attribute of the familiar ancestor (in this case , 
causal determinism) . thermore, the caus 1m chan1-
caliam which is credite d with such inf llibility, even 
bJ Sellars , obviously alipa a eon every time evolution 
occurs . Even random novolty is , at beat, uncaused--- and 
at orst a donial o~ cause . 
2. EN, 263 . Ct. , loo, EN, 161. 
3 . "It [ inorgin!e matter] lends itself to QObilo into ra-
tions ~n1ch under t hand or time ma1 load to tre ndous 
noveltioa . ' ( ...;~l , eG3 ) 
4. It is ~it posoiblo that thoir difference on just th1a 
poi nt has cuch to do with the difforonce or the time 
concept bet.oen ~owno nd Sollars . own , nsking-&Oout 
tho •arriv 1 of the fittest •, woul d quostlon whether a 
serloa of slight changes is any loss m1r culoue than one 
grand chango . ~ith thie devaluation or ' aenotic contin-
uity•, owno, hold1n~ very n arly the s e op1stemolo 7 
or duration as Sollars, attributes ti to a cha e lesa 
ulti to rather than eouatln !.!!! anachan • 
proscnt as a structure nblo to function difforon-
tially. Timo sinks into npnca . ~ it .Gre . • •• 
'£ha organism is n lnd v.i.due.l thine; which rlse s 
~top by vtcp, oach stago makin~ possible something 
h ich before had been 1m ossiblo • .L 
hen llar·s soys '1irtorv ' vo s on _nto too pre son t oG a 
otruct:ure nblc to !unct on" , it 1:: .ol 11 oly thut. ho wi:.hos 
to ive indopondont motaphysica nt t D to hiD orv. It is 
obvious , ho over, thct be dooE ish to tro ... s t:1o dotorr:~inis-
2 tic offoct of past occur:re :1coa upon prosont ox1staots. The 
effoctivenasa of hiotor- is both o~togo wtic and phylogonot-
s ic. nother acet of t o in luonco of history ts ,.ound 
wh ro Sollars cmpl oyr h.lrt,ory to "'top to infinite rogro~s : 
lnce "real ti is change' , 1istory bo no ith tho r rat 
c 'umge ,. end 6Xistonce oetno wit the f rat ~han 
--· ) oro -
rorc i _,q a m t phyo c nonuonso as oll !la a lo- lcal CO!l-
tradiction ... o · :1ply that; thoro ~ns a. timo when thoro sc no 
time, by sklng ubon ... tho beginning of ~-
Hind, n la.t-ar cat~,..,or:v. Alone; '.71th the eho.n,..,. .. ng ::Jys te!n~ of 
-
nnturnl law, yellarn f_nda the omorgonco o lnter cutogorio~, 
_!!E .. ong th.en. Ju t 10 . '1 i.s ua.:.ng t 
1~ unclear ; and it · '!.1.,ht bo uoswned thnt tlw;r have cz1ston-
t1al atatus and activity, l!ko ":J.., 1rv . 4· ·nt that such i3 
1 . ,, 334- :53o . ....ce , lso, , J.•><.a:- 155. 
2 .. Seo, for exnoplo , EN, 254 - 265 , 2G3, 2~1, 20J , 154- 155. 
3 . , 16? . 
4 . '!~ o nnd 0:1 rcy as antitio , consorv"'ticn sa charac-
ter of thooc ~~ant1~ies in nnture , and evolution <s the 
·~notic side of' many umpirical substaucos ra exa. 1) lon o£ 
1 tor c&t~gorlv~ which de ~lop and n p11fy t o roliruln ry 
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not tho cane , 1s seen in tho f ollovi n,... quotation , which 
shotts categories as merely rnentn l c l assifications into which 
OY.perioncos or e fitted , in conac1oucnosn . 
Science -r.a for many ee.r£1 an investi'"'ntS.on of ln-
organic mase~s. • •• Tho absence of mind ac n cate -
r~ory is j'l.!et whnt \'t'O s':lottld expoct . ./lnd si~ce 
e vo l ution we.a not te.kon ~or1tJ1ls ly, tho conclu~don 
drr>nl . us thr.t .11 phase A of nature cc•.:ld be u..~der­
st£'ol! ,.1 thout the idee. of m1.nd . ~ 
rrov:oveT:' , :r-cco1loet1cn thnt tli.nd is an epiphenomenon of physt-
c~l activity, brine~ fo~th th~ d~duction that the l~tcr eato -
sorior. ns idees r,rust , e.ftor ell, be r-:ffoctc of" tho causal 
e.ctiYity of brni~-mutter; and n ~"'OOd case could be made for 
their havi:-~ ex:.ntcnt:ln-1 st!.>tu::; . 2 J.t has bcct:'.:..'lo cbviou~ that 
Se l~nrs !:; .nraln tryin,.. to reduce other re~ 11 ty to rna tt-or by 
Fort people: would question, 
todny, ~ ~~atomo~t ~~nt tho er.:9tonco or n haalthy brnin ia 
nececsery for the nt:!-:r>nUll , conscioue ftlnct-1oninr, of s mind . 
Jollnro lo.:nds on tnis aapcet of co~jsc1oun :mind , an'l finds 1n 
1t proof or ·onetic continuity and, thoroforo ~ or 
cntQgorios . Thane ner cstogories 6ro at onco tho gcnarnl 
fotll.ures and tll0 ni-;na of fuller knovlodso of the world .. 
Thoir history can oo r. onmletely invostige.tcd since tboy 
c.ro:Jo in l!lodo:rn timos . T' oil" ori""ir: in the d· ta. of ex-
oerienco CEJn roadi.ly :."0 tr:l<=ad . =·~vJ a.ro :tscovorlas and 
not clod~-~ct~.on~; :.nd y·. t. they are .:1.:- ovcJ~io~ .~ ich raqub~e 
ree.noninr; n.ucl ·>rceico l,of'loct:i on. 1t (: ~ ~, BO-C'l) 
1 .... r, Z0.3. 
2 . See E •, ,...,SB , z\1;:, , 3S~ . •:,ae· 7iori.~m cot.··bl.i.shes mind u.s 
a. php:: lc~~l en ";egol'Y f'l'Ot:ing out of the C:1.ta o." obser;u-
tior! . tt r ,, 3)1) 
fl. 
justifiable reduction of mind to matter . 1 
or the 
or 
SB llara readily ndm1 ts the diftorenco of tho types of ac t1-
v1tios carried on by mind ond by bod73; but tho netic con-
tinuity convineoa him thnt mind in but a function or body 
end orgo dependent on and Q toro1nod bz it. 4 
That h~ behavior and structuro is [!12] now in 
tho world, e nnot, sure11, bo doubted by the evolu-
tionist . What 1a postulated 1 that t so capaci-
ties and aetiv1tios and orsanizat1ons can be showg 
to have grown stop by stop from proc ding stages . 
ind a a function i expressive or hi her typos of terial 
org nizations which came into being rBther lnte in tho game . 
Such declarations stir tho question h thor it i 
latter or Org ni%ation that is activ and dosorving to be 
called "roo.l" . Sollarn io not in a position to admit the 
poasiblo unroality of "sturr" 1n ravor or tho solo reality 
82 . 
or organization --- vastly majority public opinion that "sturr" 
io real would abrog te tho contention, necessary to ep1stemo-
lo ic 1 realism, that tho majori ty know r al1ty aa it ia . Thus 
1. EN, 111. 
2 . EN, 60. 
3 . "I shall argu in ths next chapter that consciousn ea is 
not a ne stut in any ~taphya1cal s~nso and that aware -
ness and cognition are functions or the structure or con-
ciousness and the activity or th& organism. But while 
p ychicnl cont ents are inseparable from cerebral states 
nd ar a iteral part of their nature , they are noYel 
just •a these statoo are novel. '' (~N, 2e3- 294) 
4 . r;. , 125, 190- 191, 193, 237, 253, 276, 2£15, 307, ~1~. 333. 
7he conclusion dcea not f ollow r rom his premises, ho ever. 
soe the second para raph b low. 
5 . ' 28 • • 
he is forr.on t;o roduco '1ind to mntter1 ; nnd tho o"olutionary 
toolt-J of' 11genot1c contin'..\i~y'' and. tho c u.s.:1l e.ff'octivcnc~n 
or orgnnizntion ( 1'creatlvo !lynthoais") arc very usoful in 
tho reduct~v¢ ef!orL . 
Our conclusion 1s tbat or"'enizat:ton .ts objoctlvoly 
~ienlfice.nt nn1 C:l.US"lly e.ff'eettvo. ru c·tion snd 
structure go tog~tbor n.t ev~ry ltPlol. U.."lction :1.3 
cut. the C>.ctlvc nl1a£o of ~truct11rc . !n ..... o othor way 
c.a:n v·o 1 "'~cr•'H'(d: ovol ut 1 n nnd brin- ,.1 Y'IJ~ and body 
tot":"othor . "" 
e llc:rs also finds authority t'or his pocl t.lon, so.tinfac tory 
. ' . 3 co nt.rn . 
The dLstl:nctic:r.. bot ·m-:-1; :.1ctcrln.l ~w-:.1:1 r..s n. n0CO!J:Jrry 
co1:di ~ion an.d nz a E.Ju£..: .:.cion'.: conrJition hr.1.c bQon notod 
G1H•l:tar .tn th13 papo:-; v:o nny n07i rr:..ico th~ quostion •;he thor 
C1"E)f-lnizatioD, slnco t cen creaLo :ne: types t) s.ct lv.ttlt~n---
1101» sots Of lar;s o£' oporntll)n :.hnt q\.tlto trunscond th.e ltHUJ 
of .:.ntn'£rmic oa L tor 4 - --does not pr~.)\"~ i t•·o lf ~:. i her ( 1) 
qur.lite.'-lvoly dif-ror-Dll.t5 , \.>r U~) ttn <Jinglo reulity to '.'(1ich 
t"rt t ~or shoulJ. be rochtced . 
l"o qualitatlvo clirfel'oncc.c . s~llars ' reply is thut organ1 -
:-;nt1.ctl dooa ~ hr vo on lnd~;p::..ndont reel! ty, lll:o P:ato 'f:> 
J . E'I1 2£ P, 201, .313. 
~ . EiJ, 5:14 • 
3 . nmhe sc lonco of' bohttvi ot•i am O!Jt!l bli. :~ho n r-J:tnrl fl!l a 
p:.1ysical ctlto;:or:;· e1•o.1.ng out of th .. dr.~.tn of obsor•va-
tion, a-)d :::o fnr thor~ is no ind-~·ody probl~ru . ~' (.Ll~ , 
301) Cf . al co 287, 29~, ?Q~ . 
•1. Tho wo1·Cn "cronte" 0.11·1 "tranncond" i.!l.l)ht bet objocted to 
by "e11e:·s; but t .. o:r art. fc lt to ..,...o r ... th.c:- accurato t o 
hiD thou ht . PerhAps theM ere 1:-mlicat!on:l he , h.imselr~ 
io not. C.OtlJiiet.s~ly o.; :..:::.-.c of . Cf., E'i! 1 263, 315 , 3~5, 039. 5. Em·. 191. 
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Ideas, but the.t an organization is a l VJays an organization .2£ 
scmotbln-z --- o.nd the ovldencaa of evolutionary sc tonces are 
that tre ori g inal stuff to be organized "':lUO t bo ~.dmittod to 
hnvc been , both phylo~one Llc&l y e.n1 onto onet :c~lly , ninir:ts.l -
particles of mntter. 1 T1e ovolut_ontl7 i !caB of creative 
nynthc oin t..nd. of the effccti vonc:;s of str·.lctu:co n llov. So llnrs 
to pootuluto thnt ore~nizntion ~nd its function" ( i~cluding 
c:onad.ous noss ) ere not qur.li to. t.l. v- > ly <.lifferent :"'rom b1i -:d , 
cnu3.:> - bo-:.md , ino:r:,an ... c z at:Lcr . 
'tfo wo~l.:.~ :Jay, tor- instnncc , tho.t t~e or,...;miz:Jtional 
dlfforonco bo t~oon an ~tom of 1ydroGe~ end one of he lium 
l:as 1n tbo fnct tbal. tho forPer contn.tns tme electron an 
proton~ ( : : srq;ar..:l n"; l:.h(.J neutron 21l'fcre 1ce, · eceuse it 
dou s nc·t nf.fec t the chemical activ1 ty of.' a t;oms -~-e~ t ione.;). 
And that tho chc.ic [.l activity o one , contrasted with t:·J.e 
incrtne:Hl o! tl"£ ether , is a f:.mction o.f t he :·m'llbor o£ s ,b -
s.toa.tic purticlcl! . .uJ.O obvicus lnfere~1co frc.11 this, f or 
Sellars , ~c~ld be t~t t he o~ly differe~co bet~cen tho two 
aloms is a quantitative difforc:nc().3 Not r...ll lntorprctors of 
Bohr':.; the or:; would a groo . 
1 . 
2 . 
329 . 
fi8, 190-1~1 , 284, 529, 33~ . 
the No thin""·- but Fallac.,· . 
f:4 . 
ho ~~11 conf ose1, is t cro any qunlitatlve diffe nco --- nl l 
.., 
_;,vtnnhysica :'. d _ffera 1ceo nro aua Jti tnt.:.vo."" 
And l vory ~uch doubt thaL chomintry c n got nlon 
, ~ .. lout the c.ctoeory of Ol"gc:.nize.tlo!l . Is a c hem-
.... co.l c o-:pound. a l:!lOrD aco·oga te ? Is !.;hare not o.n 
intil!!nte oy: thooia involved? "'I' so , tl"o difference 
botuoon the ox•grmion and tho elomenttJI'S1' chomicul 
no.:J. 'ound ... s on of do -r·' e anu not of kind . I nd yc t 5 I mul not. bolittlo t ho g!lp hlch nppa.rcnbly oxl.sts . 
Ch!Ulp;c · nd Idonti tv . 
r.,rolution o nc th t thoro ure l ovels in n· tui .... • 
that tho higher in o.n outgro rth of the lotor, that4 A nne B i.ut egx• ted r more than A end B separate . 
Evon though "An nd • D ' bocom ... n ··q;ra ted, u. d the rc lntion-
vh~.p botr.oon tho:n boco. "U o.ct.ivo , their id nt.itie3 D "A" 
un~ "!311 n;.•o in no wise de.::." [.'ed, a:; S~ llarz ~oc s it . Tho !'act 
that t.o c. L; om::; of hydrocon nnd one of oxy ... ~nrc plnc d n 
!>pc. tic.l j .... ·.·:te.po::i tic.1 t:> each other to fo1 n .oloculc of 
rt!.nro, any c'1ungc on t . o ator;!s , 
1sintogrntcd to yield up tho 
or ... innl atom:> 5 ~th th ir ori8 n l chara tcrioticn . 
'placing in spatial jux npos1tion" need not call for a our-
p oi ·o movo en~ ; tho nr nd n" .o inn movv vnts obsorved of 
all anall par ~.r icla3 coul d nee mpllsh tho pooltloning qulto 
6 
nicoly. SlmiJ~rly, olcct l ea could organizo ~.~homselv s into 
11 , 1 1 t 1 t d . ~1 . ., "'I co , c ....... n o orgun am , c . , a. J.U.1. n .r.. ... um. 
1 . :c .. , 8so, 299, 277 , 529 . 
2 • .c~~ 1 3591 343. 
3 . ..... ~, .. 29 . 
4 . E :f , 329. 
5 . '' op .r..rical ubatancon nl r and dis.Lntc to , yot t• ... :-"' 
13 conservation of tho elements . " (E1, 161) 
>. , lf~, 1 ~ -
7 . EN, 282- 285 . 
(5 . 
Org&nization- ... • hnving no soparato oxistonce and no causal 
reut1on why it should or ohould not ox1ot---nn.y como and 
org~~izstion may go, but tho m1nlmal- part1cloo r~ms1n, un-
1 
af.focte<l, .forever : form cha.ngos , "atoms" heve identity. 
Too hie;hor the dogrce of organize Lion, tho more change is to 
be expected, until the degree or coneciousnass is reached, 
\dth its nl~osl; -fr,.:;;c:H.lo··n . 2 "ltlO'l~h, forcod to the logical 
end, this llno of roasr):.1ina: "'·culd loe.ve Se l.la.rs ln n ~;cry 
.!3lootic posicion; t~1at ono·1ld occo.s lon 110 undue e.nxio ty -·-
tho Eloatice !.loom to have 1lvo(l ln the every::lay world of 
chango - illusions vith no particulnr inconvcnionco. And 
.:t.y not Qrga:P.iz;~tion. oo !;he i cntlty whoco d1ffer-
cncos npo 11 ovoluti')nY All throu .,.h the argume:..'l:. of 
this book# toe :1nvo pj."Oc lo.i!!l"..id the roall t1 of for.mS 
Evory part:tcu.lar :>ubstanco 1::: 0.:1 organizod stuff . 
Onco again, tha idea of t ho self- dependent activity of 
Organization and tho helplessness of lf.attor p rosont!i itself 
-ith an urgency- and nppar.l thnt nrc :Utrd to t-asist; and tho 
ldoa co~pr•lses a char:J,O that Solle.rs would fi0d vorj h.:lrd 
Avoids mGchan1sm. --~~----~~.-----
Playing 0!1 lhs ro.~1d.om hu~penstan.co of 
structu.ro to .~,nat.ter , Sellsrs finds , in evolull.2!!, nupport 
l 1 -~4· ,--~ 
- .,:. ' c. -.;;;; I ~..., > • 
2 . • , ~6Zs , ...,73 • 
:5~ "Stable " and "dependable " have more attractive emotional 
C "" ... ,. .... "1': COnH,t.~.LJ..O"'lC o _..!.•J • , <d...J o 
4. EN, 283- £84 , 
5 . E , 329. 
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for donyi ng tho i~tablo ochnnism of cnuso nnd ortoct .1 
Ho expGcts a no pattern or or nizntion to ·e b c to 
t1c uco" o.ny no 2 nnd unexpec t e d nctivity in tho world . ~uo 
it 13 said th.nt Sellars do ies :c1echonism --- through tllo use 
or evolution, since the lnttor 1:: tho dcscr:trt1o1"\ of tho rise 
3 
of no pat tome!> . Jhon the orean zntion ronchos sufficient 
comp1ox1ty, biologr and ovolutio show evidenco of tho occur-
..,_ 
ronco kno ~as ndJustm~~· - nd ~hen th~ organism bo~1ns t o 
5 
seek kno led o f or its otm aako , ch niam is surely do d . 
3 . Evol ution Usod Both · ys. 
In a fo portions or Sellars ' phi osop1y, it is vary 
difficult to t" l l VI ether cvol 't1on ls o! -; · sod reduct on-
1stlcally, 9X ru1s!o~i tie lly, or both. ~ any rate, ~ho~o 
unc lnas!.fia.bl c usou ro note· rthy for t'1olr e:ctont nd 
their cont1·al nlacc in io :Jystom. 
rc.so of' novoltv. --------------~-
:Lvolution is givon t;ho crodi t by Sollars 
G 
.for tho a~poaranco or nll novolty Ln tho univorafl. That the 
1 ) ' nss 1')(!7 ~132 • A.;~ 'f I I ..., - ,..,:;) ' • ., • 
2 . l!N, 165, ~92 , 33 • 
3 . Yot , at the same t1~ , Sol 111'3 atoutly maintains th t 
tho .o\'1 funct' ona ot no p ttorns nl'e :1cnusod" by tho 
o. pnttorns , ineAorab y . ( i, 2~) terial oechcnism 
i"' nccennn.ry to Sollarc ' hi o ... ophy; on tho bo. ia or it 
l lo builds h1a w'lol.o roduct ... on o :=in,. to ti'Uttor'. On the 
quootion of c aaoo and of.foct , Sollars execntoa aomo 
r mnr mblo 1-r-ouatteo . 
4 . E , 125 . 
. • , 711 . 
6 . E"~-T , 171 . 
f. 7 
tbit,hcr • has ~-ro"*n out: of the ' 1ov.cr 1 appenrs P.x1ome.t1c to 
SclJ..ara1 ; rnd tho deccription of that growth is v. doscription 
,., 
of the p<t•occco of evolution.- Dc.rwin, himsolf' ~ from his ob-
tho livin~~ procossos or n.at1.~ro. tollnr:; nfi'irmn that ttnnturo 
1~ oAperimenta nne: creative . ,,S ' 1hr.no~;cr r.he makos a 
°Crl-tHtivo ::;ynthonlo 11 , r1ovclty or::ergc~ ... 4 
Curnuluti7o into~rnti_on. Sollt'.l'O bclic,tc ~ that n large nu."n-
ber or snt~ll lnncvations , coming on top of' cnch othol' , are 
nn ttdoquatc ex·) lnnaticn or t e riuo of ra1nd rrorJ ~tter. 
This COll' lim::d .. ion or ttC\.!l'lUl tlvo integration" t1i tb ''nuturnl 
v. ::·iutionn .:orvos bo'Lh in tho oxpnnsion of Matter to oxplnin 
' all ox Jerioncos 0 nnd in tho raduc i.:ion of s t:.npo c tod oth-er 
reolit:tot;; to mr1t';o!' ~Y uho,r::.ng tho.:r ' :"am;tlc contlnul-:.y• 
~ilth it . 6 Phr•t:.;oc lila~ ncumnlutivo intec;rtitlorl'', ''~rof'.t1vc· 
sy-.. ·n~hcsio· , '' c rlticn:!. l)o::.lJto" , und Horgnni::;e{i pa.ckiug•· nro 
used co ol''!,jon by Sc l:~:::-f./7 ha.t tho idcn doocrves close 
attention. 
The gx'ont e-opho.niu thet Sc llfu•u pnts 
on Gr0\7th n.nd prococ;.;, or ' gone tic continuity t • at t!.rer 
1 • .!lJ., l~0-101 , 2'/8, 2[~3-285 . 
2 . " l.~ , 165, 261, 2'15. ~·2:3, 3::.·1- 3:55 . 
;., . ~N, 2G4 . Cf . EU, 110 ... 120, l~IG-l~t7 , 2G~, 282. 
'1 . ...... 1, viii, 261, 203 , 2t14-2"3 , 316 , Zl34. 
5 . ,_·r, 151, 276 , 2&! , 292, 2?G . 
6 • .W.T, 23C, 132, 2~1, 263, 2Cf , ::35. 
7 . EN, 322, 535 , viii, 154, 171, 198·1~7, 2?5, 2r2, 316 , 
:::29, ;:;::n, ~34 , ::.:3'3 , to ·1~no n i'ev-.r. 
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g i voa hi:J n:otap 1ysics a. ra sottbl nco to that of hi tehoad. 1 
Ho ev r , process for So l nrs io nlr.nys ~ncidental to m tor-
2 1 1 rcolity, novor an ontity in nnd for 1t~c f . -vo whon 
he ;r:.~.toc 'por£Ol10.lity i"' procees'', ho q ·1ckly qun 1f1on 
it \dth 'and yet ,o 1.r.wt not ~"'O to tho other e:ttrome and 
ifl' oro t.o consorv tivc :a~p ct of ti:lO sc • 
s tnry 
l lars m 1: n j or t~r-o or ovo ut1on ry c ncopta L"l 
{ ) oxpr,ndi ng u ttor" to t. 1n al l cxporionco and n l o: 
h. ' r> '1o'l!lp ricl.sm••, nd 1n (,..., r oduc:ln"" all rcal it:" t o "mn.tter" 
to a O'l h1s t(Jrin sn; a l though his t nc:orpcrnt1ono cf 
1 • .I..'J • · . , ".ill orgn ism .:.n !lD in .... :·v.:.duul t:1·!1C · ich rioca 
&t'O"P by stop , ooch. trt.C.flO r:lt".k!n~· poss.:. lo sor!lethin • ·11ch 
bofo:r hn 1 bocn 1. :oons!.b ..... . u era , 335) cr . , also , . l , 
~ -201- f!02 , 5fJ5 . 
2 . ~, 139, 19:.- 1'37, 234 1 :~65 , 281 , 202 , 284 . 
v • E.l , ~·;s . Soo, o.l!l o 1 .c;l!, !3o4-2G5. 
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CO CLUSIONS 
1 . Historical Impact. 
Ideas of biolo ,teal evolution have had a pronounced 
effect on m ny phi losopbieo . Although Darwin's influential 
ork was publ ished in 1B59J and althour h it i~d1ately 
touched orr fires in ny fio l da or thou~htJ distinct philo-
sophical movornonts based on it did not grow until forty or 
1 fifty years later. llistorteally, r gson's Croativo Evolu-
!!2e baa been a hi bly im~ortant book --- out of all propor-
tion to its s1Pn1f 1oance as a treatise of taphysica . It 
has t thered all sorts ot revolts a a1nst re ason and purpose. 
Then, again, perhaps it baa not fathered ao often a a erely 
come along at an inopportune time , to provide a marriaae or 
respectability tor the mother and a name to t he child . 2 
1 . ergaon, CE, was firs t published in En~l1ab in 1911. It 
had existed in Fronch sev4r al ye rs before that, however. 
2 . One wonders it Croative volution did not hav more in-
fluence , voguo , and c!rcu!ation {n Engl and and Americ 
than in Fr ance. It t his is so, I should propose tho 
expl anation that ~ueen Victoria influenced the En lish-
speakin~ >Jo oplos much ooro than she did tho French. Ac-
cordinc l y, when her subjects (A rica was subject to her 
mora lity) sighted a lonP- nwaited opportunity to throw 
orr t he yoke of at seemod to thom a tyranny of moral-
ity, they oro quick to rab it, especially s ince 1t 
ca1•rted the authority of science . .ft.nd the sc1ont1sts or 
1900 oro brashly confident that all the basic truths or 
physical science wore thon known - - - that only refine nt 
or details re~lnod ror rosearehers . In the 19th Centurr , 
the Prench .ore probably quite as suecosstul, adv need, 
and active in science as ritain or A erica; yot the 
French seem not to have suffered tho armed co bat or sci-
ence and religion that oceurrod in ~ritain and Americ • 
itb a roll ion essentially more eonsorvative , Fr ance 
90 . 
James, Santayana, Dewey, Sellars, Alexander, and almo t the 
whol e roster or "naturalistic" philosophers follow Bergson 
both chronologically and along the same lino or doctrine . 
And most or the ac1ent1am1c, realistic, positivistic , ma .. 
terialistic, and mod1f1ed- material1at1c positions exhibit, 
bnsically, the stamp or 
biological ovolution. 
2 . Effect on Sellars . 
11th and following 
rgson•s thought , and hence o~ 
rgoon, evolution touched orr a 
scientismic revolt against tho idealism and theisa that bad 
reigned nupromo, in philosophical circles, from Kant to 
rgson. Insofar as Sollars w s a part or that r volt, 
evolution can bo oaid to have occasioned and influenced his 
whole approach to philosophy. 
However, hio spec ific applications or the ideas are 
much lesa basic or far- reaching than the general influence 
of evol ution on his perspective . 
Me taph;ys 1c s . Sollars usee the concept of evolution extrtn-
sically much more than be incorporates it intrinsical ly into 
sti11"allowed her sc ientists to pursue t heir researches 
unpersecuted. Tho moat valid explanation I see is that 
Britain and America •ere philosophloo- culturally ready 
for revolt ; and rgson, to use his own etaphor, merely 
furnished tho causal spark that roloasod tho energ7 ot 
tho explosive in the situation. 3orgson may or tnay not 
have been aware of tbo situation when ho wrote so prophe-
tico.lly, "Uo ideas aro arising, now fool! s are on the 
way to f l ower. " (CE, 152- 153 } 
his metaphysics . For this reason, i t is much more difficult 
to evaluato tho place of the concept in his philosophy than 
might bo expected. nowever, soco of tho uses are quite clear. 
S&llars believes that there is---in evolution through 
tho natural selection of random, pur poseless var1at1ona- --
sutf1c1ent basis for denying any over-arching purpose in 
naturo. Sy finding tho deter:n1nation or the present in the 
past, Sellars seeks retuge from purposo 1n blind echanian. 
He comos to believo the complex ot contributory influences 
is enough groater than the sum of them that tho complex baa 
life and creativity of its own. 1 By thia line of reasoning , 
Sollars cocos to tho conclusion that "1nort p ysical matter 
hns in it the stut'f to become tho conscious, willing beings 
that ~ aro . "2 Sellars • Nature, ith its blindness, and at 
thG sa time its vitality, croativ1ty, and unconquerable 
drive , bears a very eloso resemblance to Uercson•s llan vital. 
Organization is an effective entity of its own, wherever 
t o or more particlos of matter have a relationship , aa Sel-
lars sees 1t. He finda organization to be the result or 
evolution. 
The place of evolution 1n Sollars• metaphysics may be 
summarized very s1mplys evolution is the ana by which 
Matter (blind, unconscious, and purposeless) tranafor a it-
self into conscious , 1ntol11gent. croativo, volitional 
human beinga (and boyond them, into humnn societie s) . It 
l . ~N, 263 , 334- 335 . 
2 . E'T ' 343 . 
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seems fair to describo tho evolution which accomplishes this 
as tho sun (or is it tho gostalt?] of tho chance occurrences 
whon things happened to fall to otbor into now patterns . 
ID>1atornology. Evolutionary ideas function in Sollars ' 
ep1atomology only to tho extont of providing, in "gonetic 
continuity" , a tenuous connection botween oind and 
in support of his correspondence theory. 
tter, 
Unification or tho sciences. Sellars uses the evolution-
ary ideas to trace life and consciousness back to a material 
b sis . When this taphyoical connection is completed, the 
disciplines which study lite and consciouaness are, by tho 
same tokon, united with physics and chemistry. 
Ro lision. Sellars adheres to humanism as a "religion"; and 
evolution helps allo the contention that can is tho hignost 
exprosaion of the nature or the universo. 
In tho denial of tr ditional forms of roll ion, tho pos-
tulation of evolution, as the purposeless yot powerful a ont 
which accounts tor tho origin of mankind , plars tho major 
part. 
Ethics. Sellars does not h ve an "evolutionary ethics" in 
tho traditionQl use of tbe phrase. And evolutionary ideas 
seem to have had little effect on his ro~lation of an ethi-
cal system. 
93 . 
So tar as this study can determ1no , evolutionary 
ideas have had no effect on Sellar • logic. 
Re l igio- sc1ent1f1c eynthea1a . The concept or evolution 
bas, in tho past, often boon tho d ividing point between 
science and religion . ~horeas somo philosophors have ona 
to considerable otfort to aynthosize thom; to all appear-
ances , Sellars doos not oaro to synthesize, but prefers to 
olloinate religion, at least in any fora involving aoltnow-
lodgment or a supernatural. 
BIBLIO"'RAPBY 
.... ._ .. .__ ........ we 
A Catalog of Pooka Reereaonted by Librart of Conureaa 
Printed Carda . 
Ann lroor, Uiehipana Edwards rothore, Inc., 1946. 
Cards 1ssu d by Library ot Congress up to July 
31, 1946 . Supplemonts in mngazin form, monthl7 
and annually. 
ADA S, G. P., and~ • P . Ol1TAGUE (ed. ).--CAP 
Contom?orary I rican PhiloaophJ• 
London: Goorge A!!en & Unwin, 930. 
BI::,RGSO , Uenri .--C:C 
Croat1ve Evolution, (tr. A. itoholl) . 
tow Yorks Modern Library, 1944 . 
BRIG~ , Edg r Sheffield. --NAV 
ature and Values . 
Nashville , Tonn. r Ab1ngdon- Cokoabury, 1945 . 
COHEN, I. , rnard. - - Art. (1955) 
"Tho Portrait or a St rtled ~ra" . 
New York Timos ook Revie , April 3, 1955. 
CO KLI , Edwin Grant.--DHE 
The D1roet1on of Ruman Evolution. 
Row Yoril charl es Sorlbner t a Sons , 1921. 
D R"'..nt, Ctlarlos . - - oos end DOll 
The Or1rin of Species and The Descent of an, (publlshe& to et6er In odern Library alant Edition) . 
New York: Random ouae , no date . 
DODS01, dwnrd 0.--TO 
A Text book of Evolution. 
Pfi!1ade1phla: ;. • Saunders Company, 1952. 
DRAKE, Durant~ et al . - -ECR 
Essays in Crit!Ony-nonl1sm. 
London: Kae'liiillen and Co. , 1920. 
DUNK, L.c . , and Thoodoa1us Dobzhansky. --BRS 
Horedity Race , and Soeieti, (rov . od. ) . 
Row Yor~: Now Amerle n Library, (194 }1952 . 
FISKE, John. --EOE 
Excursions of an Evolutionist . 
No YorK: tloughton Mifflin, (1883)1911. 
95 . 
UO ISON, G. n.--LOE 
Tbo· Limits ot Evolution. 
New Yorkr The Macmlifin Company, 1901. 
HUXLEY, Thomas H. --SCT 
Science and Christian Tradition, (v . 5 ot Collected 
~saays .) 
Hew Yorka D. Appleton, 1898. 
BYRD N, Olan R.--OLF 
The Origin of Lite and tho Evolution or Liv1ns 
Things . · 
New-yorkt Philosophical Library, 1952. 
KUTTNER, Henry (peoud. Lewis Padgett)--TFC (1951) 
Tomorrow and Tomorrow, nnd The F 1~ Chessmen, 
1st ed. 
ow Yorke Gnome Press, 1951. 
de LAGUNA , Theodoro and Grnce ,--DAE 
Dogmatism and · ol ution. NewYorks The 'Micmi:C'Ian Company, 1910. 
LANE, H. H.--ECF 
Evolut ion and Christian Faith. 
Pr! ncetonc f r1nceton Universi ty Press, 1923. 
KORGAN, ConWJ tloyd.--BE 
Emergent Evolution. 
New,.orkt Henry Jlolt, 1923. 
HUELDER, Walter, and James B. Sears.-·DAP 
Tho DeveloRment off American Philoao,Rhy. 
!ostont Houghton, Uttt:C!n, !046. 
WLLER.-•AP 
Amerikaniaohe Philosophie , v . XXXI or Frommanns Klassiker 
der Phi los ophie . 
Stuttgarta-pr. Frommanns, 1936. 
du NOUY, P . Leoomte .--HD 
Human Destiny. 
New YorKt Uiw American Library, (1947 )1949. 
OTIS. Louis- Eugonc . --DDR 
La Doc t rine de L' Evolut1on, 2 vol., (Opus 
'P~l!osopfe of lroSieoos ~ontorr.ora1n~ >. 
ontrea : ! d t one ~ides , 19~ • 
PATRICK, George Thomas ~hite--!TP 
Introduction to Philoso~~t' {rev. ) New Yorks lioughton UI~i n Co~any, 1935. 
9 in tho aerie a 
96 . 
RILEY, Isaac oodbridge .--ATP 
A· rican Thou"ht troo Puritanism to Pra yond. 
Now Yorkt ilGnry "qolt, 192:5. · 
RUNES, D gobort D.--PD 
Philosoeb1eal D1ct1onart . 
New York: Pb!!osop6Ica Library, 1945. 
Contain. some definitions b7 Roy ood Sellars . 
SCHUUCKER, Samuel Chr1st1an.-- 'OE 
The ~aninp of Evolution. 
ew York: 'J•iie Chautauoua Preas, 19l:S. 
SEARS, Paul B.~-cD 
Charles Darwin. 
New York: cfiarlos Ser1bner•s Sons, 1950. 
SELLARS, Roy lood.--Art.(1907)1 
"The tur of perioneo" . 
Journal or PhiloaophX, IV (1007) , 14- 18. 
-------.--Art . (l907)2 
"Prof. Doyoy 1 s View of Aereo~ent" . 
Journal of Philoaophz, IV (1907), 432- 435 . 
--......... .,. EN 
Evolutionary nturalism. 
cbloano: Opon court, !922. 
-------.--RCA 
Rolip:ion Co:!l1ng of A~e. 
Ne -vork: ~he:iicmi ian Company, 1928. 
----·--.--Art . (l930) 
"Realism, Naturalism, and Ruman1sm" . 
Contem~orary Amerioan Ph1loeophz, (ed. Adams & Montague) • 
............ ... pPft 
The Philosophy of Phtsieal nea11am. 
ew York: Tho aem! ian ompany, 1932. 
- ------. - - Art . (l943) 
"Dewey on Uator1nlism0 • 
Journal of Phi losophy and Phenomenalogical Research. 
III {1943) , 383. 
07 . 
sn.~SON, Georgo oaylord.--UOE 
'rho oan1ng or Evolution, ( tentor od. , rov. and abrid. ) . 
New Yoria1~w AmGrlcan Library, (1949)1951. 
SHUTS, .Jan Christ1an.--BAE 
Holis~ and Evolution. 
lfew Yorfh S iaciiii1lan Company, 1926. 
SPENCER, Horbert .--FP 
Fi~at Pr1ne1ploo . Now Yoria ~ . P. Collier & Son, 1902. 
STL'llNO'l'TE , Alrrod P. ; . F.-ER 
Evolutionnrt Real ism. · Ph.n. ~hes s , HArvard University, 1951. 
Bound copy or an unpublished dioaertation 
eubm1ttod but not accepted. Full title: 
Tho Evolutionary Roaliam or Roy 'lood Se 11ars 
and samuo1 K!exandOr and its Boar!rig on 
Itoflglon. 
UTT, Richard H.--Art.( l953)1 
"~volut1on: Fact or Fiction?" 
si~ps or the Times, eo, no. 14 {April 14, 1953}, 7, 14-15. 
---. --Art . (l953)~ 
"Evolutions Science or Religion'" · 
Signs of tho Times, 80, no. 15 (April 21, 1953), 7 . 
VILLEE, Claude A. -BIO 
Biolo~ (2nd od. ) . 
Pnti~ lphiat w. B. Saunders, (1950)1954 . 
IERKMEISTER , \7 . U.--TIPIA 
A Risto~ of Philos~~hicnl I deas in hmorica. lie Yor~1 The Ronat= Praso, f§4~ . 
Press, 1949. 
98 .. 
99. 
STRlCT 
Tho qlostion - - - otbor a biolo icnl conccnt , such s 
evolution, enn hovo a profound ofCoet in such a rcmoto field 
or study as profees~onal philosophy --- mu~t bogin ith o dis-
cussion of bat evolution moan~ to biolo7lnts , ~nd did an 
at tho time the phlloaophcr in quootion as formul tin- his 
philosophy . Tho nn es of I~ arck, Dar ln, end DoVrles stand 
for three theories of the thod of evolution, current t 
tho time Sell rs as ormul tin his motaphysics; and there 
~ a no cceptable ..:ay of choo«•in among them. Ho over, 11 
o o a reed that volution h d occurred and byovol1 tion they 
meant a continuous chain of descent occompaniod by odifica-
tion of inh '!"i tnnco until a no opoc1en had boon formed . 
Since Sellnrs doos , as most p ilosophers do, hnvo his 
o vocnbulary of spoc1nl torms , tho nood or a ~lossar1 is 
indicntod, to contain such ter n s : thinr-; , o is tent , datu , 
cont nt , perception, cator;ory, thinghood , intuit , kno lod o , 
objec t , correspond, physical, le , connection, continuity, 
struc turo , ftmc t1on , or nia , sys tom, cmorgenco , t1mo, ex-
pl n tion, history, nnd c umulation. Tho thorough oxplana-
tion of theso terms acta to doccribc , to c con~idernble 
extent , Sc l lnrs ' philosophy. •o evor, cnother separnto 
c pter is nccess ry t o givo an nde~uato picture or Sellars ' 
tnphys1cs , opi~temolo y , unification of tho sciences, 
approach to tho mlnd- body >robl om, emphasis on evolution, 
and rejection of God . 
Two major tondonclos are found in Se llars • philosophy; 
ono 1El toward e, realism in motophyr.lcs; the other is tov;ard 
an omplricism in epistor.lology. Although he seems novcr able 
to com!)lotely harmonize the two, thoir twin influoncos aoom 
to account ~or tbo dotnils of his philosophy to a r ather 
largo extant. 
Ep1stcmol on1cellj, Sellnrs is a critical rea list, be-
lieving in tho scpaz•ntion of the Jmower nnd the objec t of 
knowledr;o ; u.nd at tho same time hold i ng that tho objoc t is 
known as it ronlly exists . His position vacillates from 
certainty about tho corroopondonco of thought and objec t to 
admission the.t this cor•rospondenco is an unsupported act of 
faith . The criterion of truth also vaelllc.tos from vor1f1 -
cotlon throu"h tho sonnon to lor icnl coherenco . ~ollara 
!:'llowa lrno..-;lod~o of non-mntorlo.l z~oe.litios only whan they 
can ba connected to m~terial roalitioo . It soems likaly 
that Sollars ' epistemology has boon partly do tor lned by his 
metaphysics . 
Tho desiro to be empirical nnd to bo materialistic 
lends Sellars to attomnt a unification of the sc1oncos by 
l>uild1ng thnm into a pyramid based on physics . 
Tho mind- body problom is sol ved by Sollars on the bo.sio 
thot , m:tnd boinrr unknown to him, except; as it occurs in con-
nection with end 1s kno\l;n throU[~h a body, 1 t therefore never 
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exists Bf>art rrorn body. Io tracos a "genetic continuity" 
wt1ich is t.o attest tho rise of' mind from body. This mind-
body solution is the phi l osophical basis of Sollars ' rojoc-
tion of God---a diaombodiod spirit . 
Evolut ion looms l nr t;e in tho jusiJ:tflcotion of the foro -
going ~octrlncs , glvlng tho major nrgumont for "geneti c co"l-
tinui.ty" end the b~sia or mind in body . 
Evolution is used in both tho reductionlstlc o.nd c:r.:pcn-
sionlstlc phases of Sollars ' defence of onterlal nonlsn. 
Evol ution is supposedly tho method by which tho non- material 
rose throuf'h u rt.mdom procos::~ from tho material: if this 
rlso is r,r nntod , t hen o1thor the reduction of non-matter to 
the oaterial or tho expansion of the concopt of mattor to 
include the non- mAterial is not far off. . Also, 1f the rise 
.1e granted , tho cnso for only quantitath~e differences be -
tween mind and rnc.tto r i s vory easy to make ond tho case for 
qun. l itativ& difforoneos is rather hard to defend . Tho fact 
and ir:nortanco of orr,aniza tion 1vo credo nco to So llnrs ' 
p lea for 11ronotic continuity11 • 
Most of Sellars ' diroc t u.sos or evolution nro extrinsic 
rathor thon 1ntrincic ; but , uhothe1 .. ns method or contro l 
doctrine , tho i deo. has exerted a major influonco on h is 
philosophy . 
I. ~ oto · £11o fn l locy of ar,·uMentUI:l ad 1 ~"-"lOro.ntiam . 
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